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Preface 
Every language has a way of talking about knowledge, and expressing information 
source. Some languages have a grammatical system of evidentials; others employ addi-
tional means to express information source and the ways in which speakers know what 
they are talking about. The marking, and the conceptualization of knowledge, vary 
across languages and cultures. This volume aims at investigating the varied facets of 
evidentiality, information source, and associated notions. 
The volume starts with a typological introduction outlining the marking, and the 
meaning, of evidentials and other ways of marking information source, together with 
cultural and social aspects of the conceptualization of knowledge in a range of speech 
communities. It is followed by revised versions of twelve of the fourteen presentations 
from the International Workshop 'The grammar of knowledge: held at the Language 
and Culture Research Centre, James Cook University, 16- 21 July 2012. An earlier ver-
sion of Chapter 1 had been circulated to the contributors, with a list of points to be 
addressed, so as to ensure that their detailed studies of individual languages were cast 
in terms of a common set of typological parameters. (This is the seventh monograph 
in the series Explorations in Linguistic Typology, devoted to volumes from the Inter-
national Workshops organized by the co-editors.) 
The week of the workshop was intellectually stimulating and exciting, full of good 
discussions and cross-fertilization of ideas. Each author has undertaken intensive 
fieldwork, in addition to experience of working on linguistic typology, historical com-
parative issues, and problems of areal diffusion. The analysis is cast in terms of basic 
linguistic theory-the cumulative typological functional framework in terms of which 
almost all descriptive grammars are cast-and avoids formalisms (which provide rein-
terpretations rather than explanations, and come and go with such frequency that any 
statement made in terms of them is likely soon to become inaccessible). 
It is our hope that this volume will provide a consolidated conceptual and analytic 
framework. We aim at covering the major parameters of variation in the expression of evi-
dentiality, information source, and knowledge in general across languages of the world. 
We are grateful to all the participants in the Workshop and colleagues who took part 
in the discussion and provided feedback on presentations at various stages, particu-
larly, Michael Wood, Yongxian Luo, Grant Aiton, Hannah Sarvasy, Mikko Salminen, 
Dineke Scholckin, Esther Sti.itzle-Csaja, and Lidia Suarez. We owe a special debt of 
gratitude to Brigitta Flick and to Elena Rh ind, for helping us organize the Workshop in 
a most efficient manner. Brigitta Flick's support and editorial assistance was, as always, 
invaluable. A very big 'thank you' goes to Amanda Parsonage, for her assistance and 
cheerful support during the preparation of the final manuscript. 
Preface xi 
The Workshop was made possible through the Australian Research Council 
Discovery Project 'The grammar of knowledge: a cross-linguistic view of evidential-
ity and epistemological expressions: We gratefully acknowledge financial assistance 
from the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences and from the Cairns Institute at James 
Cook University. 
As with all previous volumes emanating from our International Workshop (also 
published in the series Explorations in Linguistic Typology), we owe a considerable debt 
to John Davey, our editor at Oxford University Press. His support, and encouragement, 
make our books feel welcome. 
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SU PRESS 
SVC 
TAG 
TAM 
TEL 
TEMP 
TERM 
TOP 
TOP.NON.A/S 
TR 
UN CERT 
UN WIT 
VBLZ 
VEN 
VIS 
VIS 
VN 
voe 
WIT 
speculative 
location 'on' 
stative 
subject 
subject of marked clause is object of controlling clause 
subordinator 
subordinate 
superessive 
serial verb construction 
tag particle 
tense-aspect-mood 
telic 
temporal 
terminative 
topic 
topical non-subject 
transitive 
uncertain( ty) 
unwitnessed 
verbalizer 
ventive 
visible (Chapter 8) 
visual 
verbal noun 
vocative 
witnessed 
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The grammar of knowledge: 
a cross-linguistic view of evidentials 
and the expression of information 
source 
ALEXANDRA Y. AIKHENVALD 
Every language has a way of speaking about how one knows what one says, and what 
one thinks about what one knows. In any language, there are ways of phrasing infer-
ences, assumptions, probabilities, and possibilities, and expressing disbelief. These 
epistemological meanings and their cultural correlates are the subject matter of the 
present volume. 
In a number of the world's languages, every sentence must specify the information 
source on which it is based-whether the speaker saw the event, or heard it, or inferred 
it based on visual evidence or on common sense, or learnt it from another person. As 
Frans Boas (1938: 133) put it, 'while for us definiteness, number, and time are obliga-
tory aspects, we find in another language location near the speaker or somewhere 
else, source of information- whether seen, heard, or inferred - as obligatory aspects: 
'Evidentiality' is grammaticalized marking of information source. This is a bona 
fide grammatical category, on a par with tense, aspect, mood, modality, directional-
ity, obviation, negation, and person. Just as 'person' can be fused with 'gender' and 
'number', evidentiality may be fused with tense or aspect or mood. Its expression, 
and meanings, may correlate with sentence types: evidentials in questions may have 
overtones different from evidentials in statements. Exclamatory sentences may have 
no evidentials at all. Evidentials in commands are very limited in their meanings. 
In §1, we briefly revisit the relationship between evidentialityand information source. 
§2 presents a potted summary of evidentials and their meanings across the world. In §3, 
we turn to the means other than grammatical evidentials which can cover information 
source, and attitude to information. Evidentials may have non-evidential extensions. 
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Their use tends to reflect cultural norms and conventions. And their meanings change 
as new techniques of acquiring information become available. These are the topics of 
§4. Ways of talking about knowledge in languages with, and without, evidentials are 
addressed in §s. In the last section (§6) we offer a brief outline of this volume. 
1 Evidentiality and information source 
It is not uncommon for a linguistic term to have a counterpart in the real world. The 
idea of 'time' in the real world translates into 'tense' when expressed in a language. 
'Time' is what our watch shows and what often passes too quickly; 'tense' is a grammat-
icalized set of forms we have to use in a particular language. Not every time distinction 
acquires grammatical expression in the language: the possibilities for time are unlim-
ited, and for tense they are rather limited. Similarly, an 'imperative' is a category in the 
language, while a command is a parameter in the real world. Sex distinctions between 
males and females is often translated into the category of 'gender: Along similar lines, . 
'evidentiality' is a linguistic category whose real-life counterpart is information source. 
Information source can be expressed in a variety of ways. 1bese may include lexi-
cal means, including verbs of perception ('see: 'hear: 'smell') and cognition ('know: 
'understand: and so on). Modal verbs, particles, parentheticals of various sorts, and 
even facial expressions, can be used to express inference, assumption, and attitude 
to information- whether the event is considered probable, possible, or downright 
unlikely. In any language, there is a way of reporting what someone has said. All lan-
guages use quotations, and many have direct and indirect speech reports. Their use 
may interrelate with attitude to the information quoted or cited. For example, a ver-
batim quote in Arizona Tewa implies that the speaker does not vouch for the informa-
tion quoted (we return to this in §3.2.4). To sound neutral a speaker would prefer an 
indirect speech report. 1 
Any means of expressing information source may correlate with attitudes to infor-
mation, and communicative strategies- which information is considered more valu-
able, and how it is expressed in culturally appropriate ways in each language. 1bere 
are, however, significant differences between evidentials and non-primarily evidential 
means 'co-opted' to cover some information sources. 
In a nutshell: grammatical evidential systems are closed and restricted, with lim-
ited choices available. 1be scope of grammatical evidentials is usually the clause, or 
the sentence. Only very occasionally can a noun phrase have its own evidentiality 
specification, different from that of a verb; we return to this in §2.2. In contrast, other 
means of expressing information source offer open-ended options in terms of their 
semantics, and can be more flexible in their scope. Expressions related to information 
' Kroskrity (1993: i46); Aikhenvald (2004: 139); Aikhenvald (2011c: 322) for typological features of speech 
reports. 
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source are heterogeneous and versatile. They include closed classes of particles and 
modal verbs, and a potentially open-ended array of verbs of opinion and belief. The 
term 'lexical evidentiality' is misleading in that it obscures these differences (we briefly 
turn to this in the Appendix).2 
In languages with evidentials, these are never the only means of expressing informa-
tion source. Verbs, adjectives, adverbials, and speech reports may provide additional 
detail, to do with attitude to knowledge-the sum of what is known and the informa-
tion this is based on. 
Our main concern within this volume is a cross-linguistic investigation of expres-
sion of knowledge through evidentials as a major grammatical means to express the 
information source, and through other means. We also focus on their correlations with 
types of knowledge including traditional knowledge, information acquired through 
more modern means, cultural conventions, and speech practices. The 'grammar' of 
knowledge subsumes the principles of expressing how one knows things, and what this 
knowledge is based on. Every language will have ways of talking about these issues, 
but these will vary. 1bere may be constraints on how specific, or how vague, one is 
expected to be. 1he practices of talking about what one knows, and how one knows it, 
may turn out to be shared in languages with and without evidentials. 
Evidentials often come from grammaticalized verbs of perception, from modal 
markers, and from verbs of speech. A typology of lexical and other expressions of 
information source will help us trace the origins of evidential systems. 
Terminological clarity is essential in any branch of science, and linguistics is no 
exception. The Appendix lists a few common misconceptions about evidentiality and 
'evidential' meanings. 
2 Evidentiality: a bird's-eye view3 
Evidentiality is a grammatical marking of how we know something- whether we saw 
it happen, or heard it, or smelt it, or inferred what was happening based on logical 
assumption, or on a result we can see, or whether we were just told about it. In perhaps 
a quarter of the world's languages, marking a selection of information sources is a 
1 Further details on evidentiality as a grammatical category, its meanings and developments are sum-
marized in Aikhenvald (2004, 2006); grammaticalization of evidentials is discussed in Aikhenvald (2011b); 
evidentials and other means of expression of information source are contrasted in Aikhenvald (2008). An 
up-to-date bibliography on evidentials is in Aikhenvald (2011a). There are useful papers in Aikhenvald and 
Dixon (2003), Johanson and Utas (2000) and some in Chafe and Nichols (1986). Earlier approaches to evi-
dentiality which are strongly recommended, include Boas (1938), Jakobson (1957); and especially Jacobsen 
(1986). On the opposite side of the coin, a warning should be noted that Willett (1988), de Haan (2005), and 
van der Auwera and Plungian (1998) and many of the papers in Diewald and Smirnova (2010) are of decided-
ly mixed quality (see the review in Aikhenvald 2012b ). The Appendix addresses some issues of terminology. 
J The generalizations here and in all my work on evidentials are based on the analysis of grammars of c. 
600 languages (since the publication of Aikhenvald 2004, I have had access to further grammars). I avoid 
limiting myself to any artificially constructed 'samples' of languages, since these are likely to engender 
skewed results. 
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obligatory.4 We now summarize a few points relevant for an understanding of eviden-
tial systems (§2.1). A brief overview of geographical distribution of evidentials is in 
§2.2. Information source expressed within noun phrases is the topic of §2.3. 
2.1 Evidentiality systems: a snapshot 
As a category in its own right, evidentiality is a relatively recent 'arrival' on the lin-
guistic scene-in contrast to other categories such as person, gender, number, and 
tense which have been household concepts in linguistics for many centuries (see Rob-
ins 1967). 1bis may well be the reason why the proper limits of evidentiality are still 
debated by some. 
The idea of obligatory marking of information source encoded in grammar goes 
back to Boas, and his sketch of Kwakiutl (Boas 1911: 443, 496). ''The source, or nature, 
of human knowledge (known by actual experience, by hearsay, by inference)' is listed 
by Sapir (1921: 108-9) alongside other grammatical concepts, such as person, modal-
ity, number, and tense. Since Boas' work, the notion of grammatical evidentiality has 
made its way into many grammars of North American languages. 
In languages with obligatory evidentiality, a closed set of information sources has 
to be marked in every clause-otherwise the clause is ungrammatical, or the speaker 
incompetent, or even not quite right in his mind (Weber i986: 142). Evidentiality is a 
category in its own right. Evidentials may occur together with exponents of modality, 
tense, or mood.5 Evidentiality can be intertwined with other categories-including 
tense, aspect, epistemic modalities, expectation, and 'sharing' of knowledge. 
2.1.1 What meanings are expressed in evidentiality systems Languages with grammatical 
evidentials divide into a number of types depending on how many information sources 
are assigned a distinct grammatical marking. Some languages mark just information 
reported by someone else. 
Nheengatu, a Tupi-Guarani lingua franca of north-west Amazonia, has a reported 
evidential marker paa (Floyd 2005). Suppose you saw Aldevan go fishing. After that, 
Aldevan's aunt Marcilha arrives at the house and asks where he has gone. You then 
reply, u-su u-piniatika (3sg-go 3sg-fish) 'He went fishing'. Then a friend comes to visit 
1 The term 'evidential' as a label for the grammatical category of information source was first introduced 
by Jakobson in 1957; and became established by the mid-196os (see Jacobsen 1986: 4-7; Aikhenvald 2004: 
10- 17). Lazard {1957) was among the first French linguists to have discussed evidential meanings ('inferen-
. ciel'), based on the material from Tajik, an Iranian language. 
5 Statements that evidentiality is a type of verbal modality can be found in Palmer (1986), van der Auwera 
and Plungian (1998), and Willett (1988) are not borne out by the facts of languages, and are mistaken. See 
the arguments in de Haan (1999), Lazard (1999, 2001), and Delancey (2001), and the general summary in 
Aikhenvald (2004: 3- 10). Some scholars whose experience is limited to a handful of familiar European 
languages tend to assume that evidentials are a kind of modal largely because of their absence in most major 
European languages, thus trying to explain an unusual category in terms of some other, more conventional, 
notion. 
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and asks Marcilha where Aldevan has gone. She replies, using a reported evidential-
she did not see the man go: 
(1) u-su u-piniatika paa 
3sg-go 3sg-fish REP 
He went fishing (they say/I was told) 
Systems with just one, reported, evidential are widespread across the world. Saaroa, an 
Austronesian language from Taiwan, also has just one reported evidential (Chapter 4). 
Other languages distinguish firsthand and non-firsthand information sources. A 
typical conversation in Jarawara, an Arawa language from Brazil, is as follows. One 
speaker asks the other: 
(2) jomee tiwa na-tafi-no 
dog(masc) 2sgO CAUs-wake-IMMED.PAST.noneyewitness.masc 
Did the dog wake you up? 
awa? 
seem.masc 
He uses a non-firsthand evidential in his question: he didn't himself see or hear the 
dog; perhaps he was just told about it. The other speaker-who had indeed been 
woken by the dog and thus saw it or heard it or both-answers using the firsthand 
evidential: 
(3) owa na-tafi-are-ka 
1sgO CA us-wake-IMMED.PAST.eyewitness.masc-DEC.masc 
It did wake me up (I saw it or heard it) 
Evidentials in Jarawara are distinguished in past tense only. This is the case in many 
languages with evidentials (including Hinuq: Chapter 2 and Tatar: Chapter 3): the 
source of information is easier to gather for what has already occurred. In Tatar, the 
marking of non-firsthand information source is also associated with the resultative. 
A further type of small evidential system involves having a marker for informa-
tion acquired through a NON-FIRSTHAND source, and leaving any other information 
unmarked, or 'source-neutral'. This is frequent in Caucasian, Turkic, some Finno-
Ugric languages, and some languages of the Andes (Johanson and Utas 2000; Aikhen-
vald 2012a: ch. 9). Within the present volume, this kind of system is described for 
Hinuq, a Nakh-Daghestanian language (Chapter 2) and Tatar, a Turkic language 
(Chapter 3). 
'The 'non-firsthand' term has an array of meanings covering reported or hearsay, and 
logical deduction or inference. The evidential marker -rke- in Mapudungun, an isolate 
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spoken in the Andean areas of Chile and west central Argentina, is a prime example 
(Smeets 2007: 246-7, no). In (4), it refers to reported information: 
(4) Kuyfi miyaw-i.irke-y mawida 
long.ago walk-NONFIRSTHAND-INDICATIVE forest 
Long ago s/he wandered through the forest (it is said) 
In (5), the same -rke- describes what one has inferred: 
(5) weoweo-pe-rke-la-y 
crazy-PROXIMITY-NONFIRSTHAND-INDIC-3person 
He must be crazy (that one, he travelled through all that rain) 
mew 
through 
The 'information-source-neutral' form may refer to a variety of information sources . . 
It is the most likely one to be used in translations and elicitation, as a 'default' choice 
(see §2.2.2 of Chapter 2, on Hinuq). The information-source neutral form in Tatar 
often acquires a firsthand reading (see Figure 4 in §6.3 of Chapter 3, and an alternative 
analysis of Hinuq mentioned in Chapter 2). 
What could be the reason for this? In many languages, the least formally marked 
verb in a language with evidentiality would acquire a visual, or a firsthand reading. In 
Ersu, if a clause contains a verb without an evidential, this is interpreted as based on 
'direct' information source (§4.1 of Chapter 6, and see Aikhenvald 2004: 72-3). Thus, 
no overt marking for information source may imply that the source will be understood 
as visual or firsthand by 'default'. Having firsthand information formally unmarked 
is a strong tendency, but by no means a universal rule. A formally unmarked verb in 
Kurtop encodes uncertain future (§5.2 of Chapter 5); the expression of information 
source in this language depends on the choices made in the aspect system, and is 
intertwined with a number of further verbal categories. 
Firsthand experience can be contrasted with what one has inferred, and with what 
one assumes. If a speaker of Matses, a Panoan language, has experienced something 
directly-that is, seen it, heard it, or smelt it-they would use an 'experiential' eviden-
tial. To answer a question 'How many wives do you have?: a Matses would say: 
(6) daed ik-o-~h 
two be-RECENT.PAST.EXPERIENTIAL-3p 
There are (lit. were) two 
According to Fleck (2007), this can be understood as something like 'last time I 
checked, they were two'. Evidentials are there only in the past: again, this makes sense 
because information source is clearer for events which have happened. 
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If a speaker sees a dead man, and there is no natural cause for death in sight, they 
would use an inferential evidential: 
(7) nenechokid-n ak-ak 
shaman-ERG kill-REC.PAST.INFERRED 
(I infer that) a shaman (must have) killed him 
And if the speaker has not seen the corpse yet, and assumes that the shaman may have 
killed the man, the 'conjecture' evidential is the right choice: 
(8) nenechokid-n 
shaman-ERG kill-REC.PAST.CONJECTURE 
(I guess that) a shaman (may have) killed him 
Neither the inferential nor the conjecture evidentials imply any uncertainty. If the 
speaker thinks that the shaman might have killed the man, but they are not sure, they 
will use a counterfactual suffix -en on the subject: 
(9) nenechokid-n-bi-en 
shaman-ERG-EMPH-COUNTERFACTUAL 
A shaman (might have) killed him 
ak-chito-ak 
kill-UN CERT-REC. PAST.INFERRED 
Ersu, a Tibeto-Burman language, marks three information sources (§4 of Chapter 6). 
If information is acquired directly, that is, through seeing, hearing, feeling, or smelling, 
the verb is formally unmarked. There is a special marker pa for inferred and assumed 
information, and a reported evidential used if the speaker's statement is based on 
something someone else had told them. A quotative marker is in the process of being 
grammaticalized. 
What one saw can be contrasted with what one learnt through hearing and smelling, 
and through various kinds ofinference. Tariana, an Arawak language from north-west 
Amazonia, and its many East Tucanoan neighbours, have five options. Ifl see Jose play 
football, I will say 'Jose is playing-naka', using the visual evidential. Ifl heard the noise 
of the play (but didn't see it), I will say 'Jose is playing-mahka: using the non-visual. If 
all I see is that Jose's football boots are gone and so is the ball, I will say 'Jose is playing-
nihka', using the inferential. If it is Sunday and Jose is not home, the thing to say is 'Jose 
is playing-sika' since my statement is based on the assumption and general knowledge 
that Jose usually plays football on Sundays. And if the information was reported to me 
by someone else, I will say 'Jose is piaying-pidaka', using the reported marker. Omitting 
an evidential will produce ungrammatical and unnatural sentences. 
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Recent studies in grammatical evidential systems have revealed the existence of fur-
ther terms. Yongning Na (Mosuo), a Tibeto-Burman language (Lidz 2007), has a 
direct or visual, an inferential, a reported, and a quotative evidential, and a further 
term which covers general knowledge. This marker is illustrated in (10) (numbers 
represent tones): 
(10) nm3 bu33 nm3 bu33 ~.i33 tu33-kuJ 33 di-31 tm3 
Na POSS Na POSS family-Loe all COMPARATIVE 
tJ31 tsa.33=d:zJ33 :zi-33 mi33 thi-33 li33 ~· 
important/busy=COMMON.KNOWLEDGE.EVID hearth room this CL c' 
In Na families, more important than anything, as everyone knows, is the hearth r ;' . 
Kalmyk (Chapter 7) has a special evidential for 'common knowledge', and so does 
Mamainde, a Nambiquara language. Mamainde has two further evidentials, for sec-
ondhand and for thirdhand information. 
No spoken language has a special evidential to cover smell, taste, or feeling: this 
complex of meanings is typically covered by a non-visual, a non-firsthand, or experi-
ential evidential. However, Catalan sign language is reported to have a special eviden-
tial marking smell (Sherman Wilcox, p.c.). 
Amazonian languages may have further terms. In the Southern Nambiquara dialect 
complex, there is an obligatory marking on the verb for, among others (Lowe 1999 ): 
• whether a statement is eyewitness-that is, implying that the speaker had seen 
the action they are reporting; 
• whether a statement is inferred or assumed, whereby 'the speaker's claim is based 
either on seeing an associated simultaneous action and making an interpreta-
tion therefrom, or on seeing a set of circumstances which must have resulted 
from a previous action and making an inference; different suffixes mark these 
two options'; 
• whether it is reported, that is if 'the speaker is simply passing on information 
they have heard from another speaker'; or 
• whether there is 'internal support'-if 'the speaker reports their "gut feeling" 
that which they assert must be so'.6 
1be meaning of 'gut feeling' or 'internal support' can be expressed through means 
other than an evidential. Tariana has a lexical verb with a similar meaning (see exam-
ple (23)), and Asheninka Perene has a bound marker -amampy 'have suspicions, mis-
givings' which may have developed out of a verb (see §2.4 of Chapter 10). 
6 See Eberhard (2009) on Mamainde, and Lowe (1999: 275- 6) on Southern Nambiquara. 
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2.i.2 Summing up: semantic parameters in grammatical evidentiality The semantic 
parameters employed in languages with grammatical evidentiality cover physical 
senses, several types of inference and of report. The recurrent terms are: 
I. VISUAL covers evidence acquired through seeing. 
II. SENSORY covers evidence acquired through hearing, and is typically extended 
to smell and taste, and sometimes also touch. 
III. INFERENCE is based on visible or tangible evidence or result. 
IV. ASSUMPTION is based on evidence other than visible results: this may include 
logical reasoning, assumption, or simply general knowledge. 
V. REPORTED, for reported information with no reference to who it was report-
ed by. 
VI. QuoTATIVE, for reported information with an overt reference to the quoted 
source. 
These semantic parameters group together in various ways, depending on the sys-
tem's internal organization. The most straightforward grouping is found in three-
term systems-where sensory parameters (I and II), inference (III and IV), and 
reported (V and VI) are grouped together, as in Quechua, Shilluk, and Bora (Aikhen-
vald 2004: i45-6; 159-66). Numerous languages of Eurasia group parameters (II-VI) 
under a catch-all non-firsthand evidential, for example Hinuq and Tatar (Chapters 2 
and 3 of this volume), and also Abkhaz and Yukaghir. This kind of system is uncom-
mon in Amazonia (although it has been described for Mapudungun, in the Andean 
region). 
Alternatively, an evidentiality system may allow one to specify-or not-the exact 
information source (in line with Aikhenvald 2003a: 3; Johanson 2003). Kalmyk, a Mon-
golic language (Chapter 7), distinguishes direct and indirect evidentials. The 'direct' 
term combines reference to sensory parameters (I and II). The indirect term covers 
the rest. The speaker may choose to be more specific as to 'indirect' evidentiality-
there is then the choice of inferred, assumed, prospective, reported, and common 
knowledge. 
We now turn to further features of evidentiality systems, highlighting those 
described within this volume. 
2 .1.3 Evidentials, and other categories Just like most other grammatical catego-
ries, evidentials interrelate with mood. The maximum number of evidential speci-
fications tends to be distinguished in declarative main clauses. The most frequent 
evidential in commands is reported (meaning 'do what someone else told you to!'). 
Evidentials in questions may reflect the information source of the answerer (as in 
Tsafiki, Quechua, Tariana, and Tucano: Aikhenvald 2004: 245-6) or the questioner's 
assumptions concerning the information source of the addressee; this has different 
consequences for their use. Typically, only reported evidentiality can be expressed in 
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commands (see Aikhenvald 2010: 138-40, for details). An evidential can be 
questioned, as in Wanka Quechua.7 
Evidentiality can interact with negation. In Myky, an isolate from Brazilian Amazo-
nia (Monserrat and Dixon 2003), no evidentials at all can be distinguished if the clause 
is negative. In contrast, negative existential copulas in Kurtop (§6.1 of Chapter 5) have 
an evidential-cum-epistemic distinction not found in their affirmative counterparts: 
indirect evidence or inference with or without 'doubt: An evidential may be within the 
scope of negation, as in Akha, a Tibeto-Burman language. 
The maximum number of evidential specifications is found in past tenses. In Hinuq, 
Tatar, Jarawara, and Matses evidentiality is only distinguished in the past tense. The 
choices made in the tense system thus determine the choices made in the system of 
evidentials (in line with Aikhenvald and Dixon 2011: 190 ). 
The choice of evidentiality in Kurtop depends on the choice made in the aspect 
system. This adds a further dependency to the list in Aikhenvald and Dixon (2011: 91) 
(there, we predicted the existence of such a dependency, but did not have any examples 
to illustrate it). Evidential distinctions made in perfective aspect in Kurtop cover per-
sonal knowledge versus lack thereof, and shared versus non-shared knowledge. 111ese 
evidential meanings form one system with expectation of knowledge, and overlap 
with the epistemic notion of 'certainty' (see Figure 2, Chapter 5). Only 'expectation of 
knowledge' is distinguished within the imperfective aspect. 
Future and various modalities-conditional, dubitative and so on-may allow fewer 
evidential specifications than the indicative. In many languages-including Matses 
(Fleck 2007)-information source is 'irrelevant' for statements about the future. Pro-
jection of information source and thus marking of evidentiality in future may have 
special epistemic overtones, as in Wanka Quechua (Floyd 1999: 75, see Aikhenvald 
2004: 261-2), and Ersu (Sihong Zhang, p.c.). In Kurtop, only epistemic meanings of 
'certainty' versus 'uncertainty' are relevant for the future (Figure 4, Chapter 5). 
Prospective evidential in Kalmyk (Table 2 and §7 of Chapter 7) expresses predic-
tions based on information inferred by the speaker at different times. 1bis takes us to 
the next section. 
2.i.4 Time reference of an event, and time reference of an evidential The time of 
verbal report about something happening may be the same as that of the happening 
itself. Or it may be made post factum. In Saaroa (§3.5 of Chapter 4), Tariana, and 
a number of other languages there can be a time gap between the event and the 
speaker's information on it (see Aikhenvald 2004: 99-102; 2012a: 259-61). 
The time of a report, and the time of the event can be marked separately, with-
in one word. In Tariana, if the speaker had just been told that information would 
happen in the future, a future marker will be used with the recent past reported 
evidential: 
7 Contrary to flawed assertions by Willett (1988), a source to be avoided. 
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(n) du-dia-karu-pida-ka 
3sgnf-return-PURPOSIVE-REPORTED-REC.P 
She will return reportedly (the speaker has been told recently) 
If the speaker has been told a long time ago, they will use the remote past reported 
evidential: 
(12) du-dia-karu-pida-na 
3sgnf-return-PURPOSIVE-REPORTED-REM.P 
She will return reportedly (the speaker was told a long time ago) 
Matses (Fleck 2007) allows combination of different evidentials, each with its own 
time reference. If the hunter SAW tracks of a white-lipped peccary a long time ago, and 
the tracks were fresh, he will use distant past experiential. This can be accompanied by 
the recent past inferred evidential, since the inference relates to the fact that the pec-
caries had been here recently with respect to the time when the hunter had seen them: 
(13) ~hektename kuen-ak-onda-~h 
white.lipped.peccary pass.by-REC.PAST.INFERRED-DISTANT.PAST.EXPERIENTIAL-3 
White-lipped peccaries evidently passed by (here) (fresh tracks were discovered a 
long time ago) 
The source of inference may be specified by two evidentials in one clause. In Yongn-
ing Na (Mosuo), a Tibeto-Burman language, the quotative evidential may co-occur 
with inferred evidential (Lidz 2007: 67), meaning that the act of speech (and thus the 
quotation) was inferred: 
rain CHANGE.OF.STATE.MARKER QUOTATIVE INFERRED 
It is inferred (that) s/he says, "It's raining" 
In Ersu (§6 of Chapter 6) the inferred evidential can occur together with either report-
ed or quotative evidential. Similarly to Yongning Na, one information source specifies 
the other. 
Making an inference or an assumption implies that information was first obtained 
and then interpreted. It may have been obtained before the speech act, or simultane-
ously with it. 1bis creates an option for a language to make additional distinctions 
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within inferred evidentiality (see Aikhenvald 2004: 95-6, on how this can be reflected 
in co-occurrence of two evidentials in one clause; similar instances are mentioned 
in San Roque and Loughnane 2012: 118). Kalmyk distinguishes two inferred eviden-
tials, depending on whether the information was obtained prior to the inference or 
simultaneously with it. The assumed evidential does not warrant such distinctions. A 
prediction can be made based on an inference (this is called 'prospective' evidential by 
Skribnik and Seesing, Chapter 7). Kalmyk distinguishes three forms: one for a predic-
tion based on information obtained in the past, one based on prediction on the basis 
of information obtained simultaneously with it, and one based on the information one 
expects to obtain (Table 2, Chapter 7). 
The possibility of 'double tense' with evidentials, and the co-occurrence of eviden-
tials in one clause is one of the many features that make evidentials special, compared 
to any other verbal category. 
Inference and assumption may not be as reliable as what one sees with one's own 
eyes. We now turn to epistemic meanings of some evidentials, and further categories 
involved. · 
2.1.5 Evidentials, epistemic meanings, shared experience, and expectation of 
knowledge Epistemic modality and evidentiality are different categories. A modal 
and an evidential marker can occur in one verb (see, for example, Chirikba 2003, 
on Abkhaz). Some evidentials may have epistemic extensions, to do with probability 
and the speaker's evaluation of the trustworthiness of information. 8 Visual evidential 
in Quechua can refer to information the speaker vouches for. Not so in Tariana 
or Tucano. The direct and the indirect evidentials in Kalmyk have no epistemic 
overtones. Meanings of 'uncertainty' and 'certainty' are a feature of just some 
inferred and assumed evidentials (Table 2, Chapter 7). 
Reported evidential in Estonian has an overtone of doubt: saying 'he is-
reported.evidential a doctor' would mean that I doubt his qualifications or abilities. 
In English, 'they say' may imply that the speaker does not really believe what is being 
reported. Similarly, the reported evidential in Saaroa ( §4.1 of Chapter 4) may be used if 
the information is not reliable. This is akin to how the ubiquitous diz que has overtones of 
doubt in many varieties of South American Spanish.9 In contrast, in Quechua, Shipibo-
Konibo, and Tariana, the reported evidential does not imply any of that. These languages 
have a plethora of other categories, which express doubt, belief, disbelief, and so on. 
As Valenzuela (2003: 57) remarks for Shipibo-Konibo, the selection of reported evi-
dential over the direct evidential 'does not indicate uncertainty or a lesser degree of 
8 Readers should be warned against gratuitously dividing languages into those where evidentials have 
epistemic extensions, and those where they do not (as did Plungian 2001). As shown in Chapters of Aikhen-
vald (2004), in the same language one evidential may have an epistemic extension, and another one may not. 
9 Summary in Aikhenvald (2004), also Kany (1944: 171); Travis (2006); Olbertz (2005, 2008), Babel 
(2009). 
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reliability but simply reported information: The reported markers in Hinuq (Chapter 2), 
Tatar (Chapter 3), and Maaka ( §2.2.1 of Chapter 9) have no overtones of disbelief or doubt. 
Neither does the reported clitic =ri in Kurtop (§7.2 of Chapter 5). Note that this clitic is 
widely used in story-telling. I suspect that if a reported evidential is used as the mark of a 
narrative genre, hardly any epistemic meanings would be attached to it. 
The complementizer kono in Maaka introduces a speech report: it is an evidential-
ity strategy rather than an evidential. Unlike the dedicated reported evidential na, the 
complementizer always has epistemic overtones of doubt. And, unlike the reported 
evidential whose scope is the clause, the scope of the complementizer may vary, from 
a clause to an NP (§2.2.1 of Chapter 9). 
Whether or not a reported evidential implies doubt can depend on the position 
of the evidential within a clause. The reported evidential nana in Tsou (Tsouic, For-
mosan, Austronesian) indicates that information was acquired through hearsay or a 
speech report if the marker appears before the verb of speech (Yang 2000: 72-3), as in 
(15). The speech report is in square brackets. 
(15) nehucma 
yesterday 
. ) 
mamee 
o-si 
AUX-3sg 
hohucma] 
go.home tomorrow 
nana [ eainca to 
REPORTED say OBLIQUE 
amo-su 
father-2sg 
I heard from other people yesterday that your father said '(you) go home 
tomorrow' 
If the marker nana occurs within the reported clause, the implication is that the speak-
er is not certain of the information in the speech report: 
(16) o-si 
AUX-3sg 
eUsvUta 
tell 
nana bumemealU] 
REPORTED work.hard 
a'o 
AUX-3sg? 
[nehucma 
yesterday 
tena cu la 
FUT PERF HAB 
Yesterday she told me that she would work hard from then on (but I am not sure 
about 'work hard') 
The grammatical marking of information source in the Kurt6p verb is intertwined 
with epistemic meanings (certainty of knowledge), the expectation of knowledge and 
'knowledge sharing' -whether only the speaker is privy to the information, or it is also 
shared by speech-act participants (§3 and Figure 2 of Chapter 5). The information can 
be expected or unexpected for the speaker and the addressee: this is the core of the 
category of expectation of knowledge, or 'mirativity' (also see Aikhenvald 2012c, for 
an overview of mirativity and the meanings subsumed under this term). The meanings 
of expectation of knowledge are linked with the meanings of 'certainty' in existential 
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and equational copulas-another area of Kurtop grammar where direct and indirect 
information source are also relevant. 
The conventionalized attitude to hearsay as a source of information determines 
whether or not a reported evidential, or a speech report in general, has epistemic 
extensions (see also §s.2 of Chapter 11). We return to this in §s. 
2.1.6 Scattered coding of information source Evidential meanings can be expressed 
within the same language without relating to just one category or type of expression 
(see Aikhenvald 2004: 80-2). Different evidential meanings in Jarawara can be 
realized in three different slots within the predicate (Dixon 2003: 185). In Hinuq 
(Chapter 2), neutral versus non-witnessed evidentiality is expressed in synthetic past 
tense. Quotative and reported particles each form a separate system. This 'scattered' 
expression of evidentiality is also found in Tatar. In this language, reported, 
quotative, and assumed particles constitute a 'layer' of evidentiality marking which is 
separate from-and independent of-the neutral/non-firsthand distinction marked 
within the verbal past tense (Chapter 3). Along similar lines, in Maaka (Chapter 9) 
some meanings to do with information source are expressed on the verb, and others 
within a noun phrase. 
Meanings to do with information source in KurtOp are expressed through verbal 
suffixes, and equational and existential copulas; there are also two additional forms, 
one marking reported information and the other one quotes. 
In many instances, the reported evidential stands apart from the other evidential 
meanings, in terms of its grammatical status and properties (also see Aikhenvald 2004: 
82-7 ). Different ways of expressing information source, and different information sourc-
es in different parts of the grammar can be analysed as different evidentiality subsystems. 
Other categories may also behave in a similar manner. Number, and gender, are 
often expressed differently on verbs, nouns, and pronouns. They may also have dif-
ferent semantic distinctions. In some languages of northern Amazonia the choice of 
a classifier depends on the modifier type, or the type of construction (e.g. Aikhenvald 
2000: 68 for a discussion of nominal and pronominal genders; Aikhenvald 2007 on 
different subsystems of classifiers in different contexts). 
Information source can be expressed through other, essentially non-evidential cat-
egories. This creates an opening for further 'scattering' of the way one can talk about 
the source of one knowledge in a given language (also see §4 of Chapter 10). 
2 .2 The geography of evidentials 
Not every linguistic area or language family is of equal relevance for our study of 
evidentiality. An overwhelming number of languages with evidentials are spoken in 
Amazonia and the adjacent areas of the Andes. They boast the richest array of evi-
dentials in the world, comparable only to North American Indian languages and lan-
guages of the Tibeto-Burman domain. 
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Evidentials are relatively poorly represented in familiar European languages (see 
Squartini 2007; Pusch 2008), in the Australian area, and in many languages from 
the large Austronesian family (other than Formosan languages which tend to have a 
reported evidential). Numerous Papuan languages spoken in the Highlands of New 
Guinea appear to have evidential systems. Some genetic groups, such as Semitic, do 
not have them at all. Hardly any evidential systems have been described for the lan-
guages of Meso-America (except for Uto-Aztecan languages which tend to have a 
reported evidential). 
Evidentials are a prominent feature in many Turkic, Iranian, and Uralic languages 
(see Comrie 2000, and Johanson and Utas 2000), and in most north-east Caucasian 
languages. Basque, an isolate, has a reported evidential (Alcazar 2010, forthcoming). 
Only a handful of evidential systems have been described for African languages. The 
few descriptions include two Nilotic languages, Shilluk (Miller and Gilley 2007) and 
Luo (Storch 2013), !Xun, a Central Khoisan language (Konig 2013), Fur, a Nilo-Saharan 
language from the Sudan (Waag 2010), Laal, an isolate spoken in the Moyen-Chari 
prefecture in Chad (Boyeldieu 1982: 125-6), Sissala, a Gur (Voltaic) language from 
Burkina Faso (Blass 1989), and Lega, a Bantu language (Botne 2003). 
Evidentials are easily diffused in language contact. They spread together with the 
diffusion of speech practices and speech etiquette, from one neighbour to the next. 
They are a salient feature of the Vaupes River Basin linguistic area (Aikhenvald 2012a: 
chs 2 and 9), and of the Balkans as a linguistic area (Aikhenvald 2004: 288--98). The 
presence of evidentials in Turkic and Iranian languages spoken next to each other 
may also be accounted for by areal diffusion. That is, we typically find evidentials in 
contiguous areas. 
Amazonia is a high spot for evidentiality. Many Amazonian groups share the cul-
tural convention of being 'precise'. Yet, not every Amazonian language has a gram-
maticalized evidentiality system. Asheninka Perene (Chapter 10) and Aguaruna 
(Chapter u) compensate for this 'gap' with a plethora of evidentiality strategies and 
other ways of specifying how one knows things. 
Once a language becomes obsolescent, evidentials tend to be lost. The last speaker 
of Bare, an Arawak language from north-west Amazonia, with whom I chanced to 
work, did not use evidentials. Speakers who were around twenty years before that did 
employ a reported evidential. The rarity of reports on evidentials in the Australian 
languages may be due to the advanced stage of their obsolescence (see Dixon 2002, 
on the state of affairs there). The reported evidential continues to be widely used in 
Saaroa, a moribund Austronesian language of Taiwan (Chapter 4); however, in many 
instances the exact meanings and conditions of its use are hard to pinpoint. 
Quality and reliability of descriptions is another matter. Many sketch grammars 
and grammatical descriptions cast in prescriptive frameworks do not have a place 
for evidentiality. A brief sketch of Shilluk, by Westermann (1911), does not mention 
any evidential distinctions. Neither does Migliazza's (1972) study of Yanomami: his 
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concern was to fit the language into a transformationalist framework, rather than to 
see what distinctions were expressed. Some grammarians are more insightful than 
others. Carlin's (2004) study of Trio discusses evidentiality; Meira's (1999) grammar 
of the same language does not mention it. I suspect that the 'lack' of evidentiality in 
Africa is due to an oversight, and not to its absence. 
Only through detailed investigation of languages based on intensive immersion 
fieldwork can we ever expand our general knowledge about the potential of human 
languages to mark information source in their grammars. It is as yet premature to try 
and map the geographical distribution of evidentials across the world: such an attempt 
would reflect how little we know about the expression of information source in Africa, 
New Guinea, and the Austronesian domain, and not what the facts are. 
2.3 The scope of evidentials: information source of a noun phrase 
Evidentials typically have sentential, or clausal, scope. Dependent clauses usually can-
not have an evidential value different from that of a main clause. Then, the scope of 
an evidential covers the whole sentence: this is the case in Hinuq (§2-4 of Chapter 2), 
Saaroa (§3.4 of Chapter 4), Ersu (§4 of Chapter 6) and numerous other languages. In 
Tatar, a language with 'scattered' expression of information source, verbal evidentials 
have the whole sentence in their scope, while the quotative particle dip extends to the 
whole speech report, and the scope of the reported particle di 'can range from a word 
or phrase ... to a whole text/discourse' (§4 of Chapter 3). 
The scope of verbal evidentials and information-source-marking copulas in Kurtop 
is the clause. In contrast, the clitic which marks reported speech (§7.2 of Chapter 5) 
may have scope over an entire stretch of discourse. But it can also be a noun phrase, if 
it attaches to just one word, indicating a direct quote. In contrast, epistemic markers 
tend to have a clause or a sentence as their scope. So do most evidentiality strategies. 
Having a noun phrase within the scope of a grammatical evidential appears to be a 
rarity. In Jarawara (Dixon 2004, and p.c.) several information sources can be marked 
in one sentence, one on the verb and one on a noun phrase. A speaker was talking 
about what had happened to him and his companions, using far past tense (referring 
to what had happened more than two years ago): they had seen a place which had been 
reported to be another group's old village: 
(17) [[mee tabori botee]-mete-moneha]NP:OotaaA awa-hamaro ama-ke 
3nsg home:f old -FPnf-REPf msg.exc see-FPef EXTENT-DEcf 
We were seeing in the far past what was reported to be their old camp from far past 
The speaker used the remote past (to reflect that it was some time ago) and a firsthand 
evidential (to reflect that he had been there and had seen everything himself). And 
he used the non-firsthand version of far past tense plus the reported evidential suffix 
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with the name of the location - 'reportedly' known to have been another group's old 
village. 'This is why the 'old village' is marked with the reported evidential. 
Ifl were to attempt to translate this word for word, I would come up with a tortured 
and clumsy sentence, such as one reads in English newspapers now and again-The 
reported killer was allegedly seen to be captured by the police. But unlike English, the 
Jarawara sentence is natural and compact. The same set of tense-cum-evidentiality 
markers is to express information source at a clause, and at a noun phrase level. 
In a number oflanguages, information source is marked only at the NP level. We call 
it 'non-propositional' marking of information source. These appear to always include 
a term with visual, or firsthand reference. 
Dyirbal, an Australian language (Dixon i972: 44-57, 2010: 244, and Chapter 8), has 
a three-term system of noun markers which combine reference to visibility and spatial 
distance of the noun: 
bala- 'referent is visible and THERE (that is, not near speaker)'; 
yala- 'referent is visible and HERE (near speaker)'; and 
r;ala- 'referent is not visible: 
There is an additional series of verbal markers which accompany nouns in a periph-
eral locational case (§4 of Chapter 8), with the same meanings. The scope of all these 
markers is a noun phrase. 
These distinctions are reminiscent of a cross-linguistically rather common eviden-
tial system, with a basic opposition between 'firsthand' and 'non-firsthand' informa-
tion source (A1 in Aikhenvald 2004; comparable perhaps to Tatar: Chapter 3). 'lbe 
'non-visible' marker covers something that is not seen but heard, or only known from 
its noise; something previously visible but now just audible; something neither visible 
nor audible; or something remembered from the past and not currently visible (§7 of 
Chapter 8). 
Somewhat more complex systems of non-propositional evidentiality whose 
scope is just the noun phrase have been described for Mataco-Mataguayan lan-
guages of Argentina and Paraguay. The markers combine reference to information 
source and to the distance of the nouns' referent. Chorote distinguishes the follow-
ing markers: visually perceived; distant (or dead/consumed); not visible now but 
visible before; invisible or unknown (used in myth) (Carol 2011). The information-
source-related markers in Maka, from the same family, cover the meanings of: 
close (can be reached by hand); close (cannot be reached by hand); far and visible; 
far and non-visible; absent, seen before; absent, never seen before (Gerzenstein 
1994: 166). 
Perceptual meanings are encoded within the case system in Tsou, a Formosan lan-
guage (Pan 2010, based on Tung i964). 'lbe 'nominative' and the 'oblique' case markers 
combine information on how distant the object is from the speaker and the addressee, 
and whether the object was seen by both speaker and hearer, or by the speaker, or not 
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seen at all (but is nearby and can be heard, or is known to both). In (18), the speaker 
cannot see the child, but its cries can be heard: 
(18) m-o mongsi 
AFFIX-REALIS cry(ACTOR.VOICE) 
The child is crying 
co oko 
NOMINATIVE:NOT.SEEN.HEARD child 
Neither of these languages have any grammatical marking for the information source 
of a clause. 
Nominal markers in Maaka indicate the information source of a topicalized noun 
phrase (§2.1 of Chapter 9)-that is, they correlate with the discourse-pragmatic sta-
tus of a noun. They encode visually acquired information, assumed information and 
information acquired through 'joint perception' by the speaker and the addressee. This 
meaning is reminiscent of the category of'shared knowledge' described for Kurtop in 
Chapter 5. The 'joint perception' noun marker in Maaka also has epistemic overtones 
of veracity and 'truth'. There is also a clausal evidential-the reported marker na (§2.2.1 
of Chapter 9). Its meanings are different from those of the NP-level non-propositional 
evidentiality. 
The Southern Nambiquara dialect complex has a remarkably complex set of nomi-
nal tense markers fused with information source; nouns are also specified for whether 
they are definite, or not, and represent given or new information (raised numbers 
stand for tones). Here are some examples, for wa3 lin3-su3-a2 (manioc-cL:BONE.LIKE-
DEF) 'the manioc root': 
(19) wa3lin3-su3-ai2na2 
manioc-CLASSIFIER: BONE. LI KE-DEFINITE.CURRENT 
'Ibis manioc root which we both see before us now 
(20) wa3lin3-su3-ait3ta2 
manioc-CLASSIFIER:BONE.LIKE-OHSERVATIONAL.MIDDLE.PAST.NEW 
The manioc root that I saw some time past at some distant place (but you 
didn't) 
(21) wa3lin3-su3-nu)'ta2 
manioc-CLASSIFIER:BONE.LIKE-INFERENTIAL.DEFINITE. UN MARKED 
The manioc root that must have been at some time past, as inferred by me 
(but not by you) 
The verbal categories of tense, aspect, evidentiality, and given information are differ-
ent, in form and in meanings (Lowe i999). 
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Southern Nambiquara and Maaka are the only languages we know of with different 
systems of evidentiality expressed on a clausal, and on an NP level. This is reminiscent 
of how tense can be expressed independently within an Nl~ and within a clause (see 
Nordlinger and Sadler 2004). In most cases discussed here, NP-level realization of 
evidentiality is intertwined with distance in space. Establishing the existence of NP-
level evidentiality is a major insight within this volume. 
There may be more examples of NP-level evidentiality. Santali (Munda: Neukom 
2001: 42-4) has a special series of demonstrative pronouns referring to what is seen, 
or to what is heard. Both distinguish six degrees of distance combined with emphasis. 
'D1e semantic extensions of these demonstratives are parallel to those in evidential-
ity systems: the visual demonstrative can refer to 'what is evident', while the auditive 
one may also refer to smell, taste, and feeling (Neukom 2001: 42). Note that a two-
term audible versus inaudible demonstrative system has not been recorded in any 
language. 
Perceptual meanings are often encoded in the system·of demonstratives (Aikhen-
vald 2004: 130-1). There, reference to spatial distance can be combined with vis-
ibility or lack of it. The obligatory 'visible/invisible' distinction in demonstratives 
in Kwakiutl, a Wakashan language, combines with three degrees of spatial distance, 
yielding a six-term system (Boas 1911: 41): 'visible, near me', 'visible, near thee', 'vis-
ible, near him', 'invisible, near me', 'invisible, near thee', 'invisible, near him' (see 
Dixon 2010, for further examples). The choice of a locational marker in Tima (§3 of 
Chapter 12) correlates with the presence of the speaker as a witness of the event or an 
object. 1be category of ventive, roughly translatable as 'move to where the speaker 
is' in Tima, and in a number of neighbouring languages, also relates to the speaker 
being witness to the event, and to potential visibility. In each of these cases however 
the information-source related meanings of demonstratives can be understood as a 
corollary of their deictic functions: pointing at something is linked to whether you 
can see it or not. 
3 Information source through other means 
3.1 Evidential strategies in grammar 
Meanings to do with how people know things may be expressed without develop-
ing a dedicated form whose primary meaning is information source. Non-evidential 
categories frequently acquire evidential extensions. This is what is known as 'evi-
dential strategies'. A conditional mood, a perfect aspect, or a passive can develop an 
evidential-like meaning as a 'side effect' (also see the discussion in Lazard 1999). 
Conditionals and other non-declarative moods may acquire overtones of informa-
tion the speaker cannot vouch for. One of the best-known examples is the condi-
tional in French (known as 'conditionnel d'information incertaine') used to relate facts 
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obtained from another source for which the speaker does not take any responsibility.10 
The modal marker mixa in Ersu (§7.i.2) has a range of meanings similar to that of the 
assumed evidential. 
Further markers may be related to attitude to knowledge. Cavinefi.a, a Tacana lan-
guage with a reported evidential, has a special marker =tukwe 'contrary to evidence'. 
Tucano, with five evidential specifications, also has baa to mark 'obvious evidence'. 
Perfect aspect can be extended to express non-firsthand evidential meanings in 
Georgian. This development is shared with many nearby Turkic, Iranian, and north-
east Caucasian languages. Nominalizations and participles often develop connota-
tions similar to non-firsthand evidentials. For example, participles in Lithuanian have 
inferential and hearsay meanings. Marking of assertion may correlate with speaker's 
attitudes to information and-indirectly-to its sources. Gascony Occitan has a num-
ber of particles which mark speaker's assertion intertwined with certainty and 'general 
knowledge'. 11 In Ersu (§7.i.1 of Chapter 6), the meanings of the 'experiential' aspect 
partly overlap with those of the 'direct' evidential. 
Or the choice of a complementizer or a type of complement clause may serve to 
express meanings related to how one knows a particular fact. In English, different 
complement clauses distinguish an auditory and a hearsay meaning of the verb hear: 
saying I heard John cross the street implies that I did hear John stamping his feet, 
while I heard that John crossed the street implies a verbal report of the result. That is, a 
that- clause with perception verbs can refer only to indirect knowledge (see a concise 
analysis of complement clauses with verbs of perception in English in the context 
of complementation in general, by Dixon 2005: 270-1). 12 Similar principles apply in 
Kalmyk. A participial complement clause of the verb 'hear, listen' implies actual hear-
ing, and a clause with the complementizer marks information obtained through hear-
say (§u of Chapter 7). In Acholi, a Western Nilotic language, a perception verb without 
a complementizer implies direct perception (Hieda 2012). 
In Aguaruna, a deverbal nominalization has developed nuances of non-firsthand 
evidentiality (§§4.2 and 5.2 of Chapter n). This is reminiscent of Mansi, Nenets, and 
Purepecha, where nominalizations have developed similar overtones (references in 
Aikhenvald 2004: 117-20 ). 
Evidentiality strategies often develop a range of meanings characteristic of report-
ed and non-firsthand evidentials: they combine reference to inference and to verbal 
report. And they are not averse to having epistemic extensions to do with probability, 
10 Denclale (1993) and Dendale and Van Bogaert (2007); see Squartini (2007) on how the conditional in 
Italian can cover reported information. 
" Giacalone Ramat and Topadze (2008); Hewitt (1995: 259, 93) on Georgian; Wiemer (2008), Grone-
meyer (1997) and Timberlake (1982) on Lithuanian; Comrie (1976: no), Aikhenvald (2004: 289-96) on 
perfect aspect; Pusch (2008) on Occitan. 
12 Also see Kirsner and Thompson (1976) on a difference between 'direct perception of a situation' and 
'deducing a situation' in their analysis of complements of sensory verbs in English. 
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inference based on results or assumption hearsay 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -7 
modalities, perfects, resultatives, passives, nominalizations 
hearsay inference based on results or assumption 
------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- -7 
reported speech, particles derived from 'say', de-subordinated speech complements including nominalizations 
SCHEME i The semantic range of evidentiality strategies. 
and also expressing speakers' attitudes to the veracity of what is being said. Mean-
ings of evidentiality strategies expressed through modalities, perfects, resultatives, 
passives, and nominalizations range from inference to hearsay. In contrast, reported 
speech, particles derived from 'say' and desubordinated speech complements may 
develop inferential meanings out of a primary meaning of 'hearsay: These pathways 
are shown in Scheme i. 
No language has been found to have a special evidentiality strategy for each 
of the evidential meanings which can be expressed (I-VI in §2.1). Many of the 
features outlined for grammatical evidentials in §2.1 are not characteristic of evi-
dential strategies. For example, no evidential strategy can have scope over a noun 
phrase. 
Evidentiality strategies in Asheninka Perene include a number of modalities. Dubi-
tative modality has inferential and assumptive meanings, and affect modality express-
es speculation (§§2.1- 3 of Chapter 10). The counterfactual conditional marker has 
overtones of speakers' reliance on their general knowledge and the ensuing expecta-
tion that something similar will occur. The bound 'intuitive suspicion marker' is used 
in reports about previous experience with speakers relying on their gut feelings as a 
basis for assumptions concerning future predictions (§§2.3-4 of Chapter 10). These 
meanings are comparable to 'prospective meanings' in the Kalmyk evidential system 
(Chapter 7), and also to the 'gut feeling' evidential in Nambiquara (Lowe i999). How-
ever, the meanings of evidentiality strategies go beyond what is typically expressed in 
closed systems of grammatical evidentiality. 
Over time, an evidential overtone of a non-evidential category may conventionalize 
as its major meaning. In other words, evidential strategies may develop into grammati-
cal evidentials. For instance, a future tense can give rise to a dedicated non-firsthand 
evidential, as happened in Abkhaz (Chirikba 2003: 262-4). 
The exact line between an evidentiality strategy on the way towards becoming a 
grammaticalized evidential and a fully grammaticalized evidential may be hard to 
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draw. Nominalizations in Aguaruna are better considered evidentiality strategies 
(with a range of non-firsthand meanings) and not fully-fledged evidentials, because 
they retain the full range of nominal functions and nominal morphology. Expressing 
information source is 'clearly not their primary function' (§4.3.2 of Chapter 11). And 
they do not always have to refer to non-firsthand information: their evidential over-
tones are optional. 
3.2 Information source in its further guises 
Every language can express doubt, inference, and assumption. The means vary-from 
open classes of verbs, adverbs, and adjectives (§3.2.1), and parentheticals (§3.2.2), to 
more restricted subsets of modal verbs and particles (§3.2.3). Various kinds of speech 
report constructions are another, almost universal, device (§3.2-4) for talking about 
what one has learnt from someone else. 
3.2.1 Open lexical classes: verbs, adverbs, and adjectives Verbs of cognition tend 
to be linked to information source, as in French penser 'think: trouver 'think, 
judge: avoir /'impression 'have the impression' and so on.13 English has an array of 
reporting verbs and opinion verbs like think, suppose, find, claim, state, or allege, 
in addition to verbs to do with seeming or appearing. Each of these is semantically 
versatile and they display subtle grammatical differences (see Dixon 2005: 
200- 6). One can say It looks like rain, or This idea sounds good, or I hear you are 
getting married-each of these ways of saying things in English can be replicated 
in German, Dutch, French, Italian, Spanish, and Swedish. 'These are the ways in 
which familiar European languages allow us to express some of the meanings 
which MUST be expressed grammatically in languages like Quechua, Tariana, 
Matses, Western Apache, and Shipibo-Konibo (where they form an obligatory 
closed system). 
This does not imply that 'exotic' languages are bereft of verbs of opinion, 'thinking: 
'claiming: and so on. 'Ibey are not-on the contrary, Tariana (Aikhenvald 2003b) has 
an array of verbs to do with mental states. And one can use them to complement the 
restricted number of five choices imposed by obligatory evidentials. By using the verb 
-hmeta in (22), I specify the fact that the use of the assumed evidential is based on my 
intuitive suspicion: 
(22) nu-hmeta-ka du-fiami-sita-sika 
I-feel.intuitively I think-subordinator she-die-already-assumed.evidential.recent. pasl 
She (assumed) has already died, as I intuitively feel (my gut feeling tells me that she is 
dead) 
'
3 See Dendale and Van Bogaert (2007), Pietrandrea (2008), and Giacalone Ramat and Topadze (2008). 
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I can also use the verb -awada- 'reason, think'. In (23), I stress that the assumption-
encoded in the evidential-is based on logical reasoning: 
(23) nu-awada-ka du-fiami-sita-sika 
I -think. by.reasoning-subordinator she-die-already-assumed.evidential.recent. past 
She (assumed) has already died, as I reason (that she is dead is a logical conclusion 
based on my reasoning) 
Tariana has no evidentials to describe intuition and reasoning. The lexical means of 
marking information source are much more versatile than the grammatical options. 
The interaction between these two is what makes Tariana discourse fascinating. There 
are many more options in the details one may want to express through lexical means 
than through grammar. 
In every language, one can talk about perception-'see', 'hear', and 'smell'. The mean-
ings of individual items in individual languages vary: Warekena, an Arawak language 
from north-west Amazonia, has just one verb -eda covering these three sources of 
perception. In Yukaghir, a Paleo-Siberian isolate, the verb of auditory perception can 
refer to vision.'4 Asheninka Perene has one verb kim covering all non-visual sensory 
perception (hearing, smelling, touching, and tasting). Its cognate in Tariana, -hima, 
has the same range of meanings, in addition to 'understand' (-hmeta in (22) is a causa-
tive form of -hima). Most chapters within this volume briefly address lexical verbs of 
perception. 
Lexical verbs can express further meanings. These may include cultural scripts for 
talking about objects and events removed from immediate perception (that is, wheth-
er one 'sees' a mental image, or whether there is a separate way of referring to 'clear 
appearance in a vision': see §3.2 of Chapter 10, for Asheninka Perene). Dyirbal does 
not have a general verb 'know': this would be too vague, and go against the cultural 
requirement to be 'precise' (Chapter 8). We return to this in §s. 
Most languages of the world have a way of badging one piece of information as 'true' 
and another as 'unreliable: This can be done through adverbial expressions. They may 
express possibility, probability, doubt, and can also extend to refer to inference, assump-
tion, validity of information, and attitude to it-that is, they may be used to refer to 
information source. English adverbs reportedly, supposedly, and allegedly are a case in 
point. One can opt to use an adjective to express a similar meaning: one hears reference 
to an alleged drug-dealer, or a supposedly false statement. The choices are many. 
Prepositional constructions may express opinion, belief, inference, and so on, for 
example Italian secondo me 'according to me', or Portuguese ao meu ver (lit. to my 
seeing) 'in my opinion: Manambu, a Ndu language from the Sepik area, with no 
14 Aikhenvald (1998) on Warekena, Maslova (ms) on Yukaghir. 
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evidentials, employs wuna mawulam 'in my thinking, lit. in my inside'. Ashenin-
ka Perene (Chapter 10), Karawari (Chapter 13), Aguaruna (Chapter n), and Maaka 
(Chapter 9) have a plethora of expressions to do with belief, disbelief, doubt, and 
veracity. 
Further means and word classes correlate with the ways in which one 'knows' what 
is being talked about, and what one thinks about this. Gestures-such as eye-gaze 
or hand movements-can be used to indicate doubt or speculation. Ideophones and 
onomatopoeia reflect sensory perception, and may correlate with sensory information 
sources (see §s of Chapter 12, on Tima). 'Ihe plethora of such means goes well beyond 
the scope of this volume. 
3.2.2 Parentheticals A parenthetical is roughly defined as 'a word, phrase, or 
sentence which interrupts a sentence and which bears no syntactic relation to that 
sentence at the point of interruption' (Trask 1991: 199). It expresses more than 'source 
of evidence': it is a way of referring to one's opinion, judgement, belief, inference, 
assumption, doubt, attitude, and more.15 European languages tend to have a plethora 
of parentheticals, such as English I think, I suppose, Spanish parece, Italian sembra; 
and French dit-on and paraft-il. 
Parentheticals in English are an open class. A parenthetical construction 'can paral-
lel any kind of sentence which includes a THAT complement clause coming after the 
verb' (Dixon 2005: 234). A parenthetical may consist of a subject and verb, and also 
an object, and provides a comment on the clause. It may express opinion (I think) or 
information source (I am told or I suspect). Adverbs and adjectives may be used in 
parentheticals. Parentheticals may occupy the same syntactic position as sentential 
adverbs, with a similar semantic effect: 
(24) a. She will, regrettably, have to sell her car 
b. She will, I regret, have to sell her car 
A verb or an adjective used in parentheticals may not have a corresponding adverb. 
Or the adverb may have a different meaning. In The King will, it is correct, enter by the 
front door, the parenthetical with an adjective indicates that this is a correct statement 
of what the King will do. But in The King will, correctly, enter by the front door, with the 
corresponding parenthetical adverb, the King will act in a correct manner. 
The meanings of parentheticals-just like lexical verbs and adverbs-are broad-
er than those of grammatical evidentials, or of epistemic markers. This is what one 
expects of an open class. Parentheticals help qualify the utterance; they also have spe-
cial intonation properties and may require a pause. Parentheticals are not uncommon 
•s Urmson (1952) is a classic study of parentheticals. Dixon (2005: 233- 8) provides a typological frame-
work and an in-depth study of parentheticals in English, in terms of their form and their function. (Dehe 
and Kavalova (2007) and Thompson and Mulac (1991) address a number of facts). 
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across the world (a further discussion of their grammatical properties in European 
languages is in Kaltenbock, Heine, and Kuteva 2011). The ubiquitous phrase nu-a-ka 
nhua (1sg-say-subordinator I) 'I am saying' in Tariana can be analysed as a parentheti-
cal, functionally similar to 'I think' or 'I am saying' in Modern English (Aikhenvald 
2003b: 583-4). Parentheticals in Hinuq (§3 of Chapter 2) express opinions and assump-
tions. Parentheticals in Ersu (§7-4 of Chapter 6) may mark, inter alia, reported infor-
mation. Asheninka Perene has an array of parentheticals with reportative meanings 
(including a self-report marker) (§3.2 of Chapter 10 ). 
The range of meanings of the parenthetical 'sense, intuit' in Asheninka Perene is rem-
iniscent of the notion of 'internal feeling' (Evans and Wilkins 2000: 554; Aikhenvald 
and Storch 2013). The range of meanings of parentheticals as exponents of information 
source go well beyond the limits of recurrent semantic parameters for evidentials as 
a closed system. Parentheticals help express subtleties of culturally specific ways of 
perception and cognition. Many chapters within this volume illustrate this. 
3.2.3 Modal verbs and particles So-called 'modal verbs' frequently combine reference 
to information source with whatever other meaning they may have. In agreement with 
Dixon's (1005) classification, modal verbs express secondary concepts, 'those providing 
semantic modification of some other verb with which they are in a syntactic or 
morphological construction' (1005: 96). In many languages they are a closed subclass. 
Secondary verbs of the same semantic group as seem (2005: 203-5), and verbs of 
obligation and permission often extend to cover probability, inference, and assumption. 
In Dixon's (1005: 204) words, 
seem is used when the Arbiter is not fully certain whether the adjectival description is appropri-
ate, or whether the statement of the complement clause in a construction like It seems that Mary 
found the body or Mary seems to have found the body is correct-perhaps when there is not quite 
enough evidence. Appear has the same syntactic possibilities and a very similar meaning, but 
may imply 'can be observed by me' in contrast to seem 'can be inferred by me: 
A link with information source is obvious-yet information source is an overtone of 
seem, rather than its only meaning. Modal verbs in Hinuq ( §3 of Chapter 2) express 
attitude to knowledge and epistemic meanings, with overtones of inference. Tatar has 
a number of modal verbs and auxiliary constructions with meanings to do with infer-
ence and assumption (§7 of Chapter 3). 
A plethora of particles referring to verbal report, or inference, or both may form a 
largish but closed class. Lithuanian has over twenty-five particles referring to verbal 
report or inference (Wiemer 2008). None of them is obligatory. Many come from 
depleted reanalysed verbs of perception, as does girdi, literally 'you hear', used to 
mark reported information; or speech, as does tariamai, a present passive participle 
of the verb 'say, pronounce: This is another non-obligatory, and yet non-lexical, way 
of expressing information source. 
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3.2.4 Speech report constructions Every language has a way of reporting what 
someone else has said. 'Ibis can be cast as a direct, or often an indirect speech report. '6 
Multiclausal speech report constructions can be viewed as lexical 'paraphrases' of 
meanings grammaticalized in closed evidential systems. And, in many languages, 
speech reports acquire epistemic overtones. Saying 'He says he is a doctor' may be 
meant to cast doubt over his qualifications. In some languages, speech reports are 
used to transmit something one does not really believe. '7 These connotations are far 
from universal-they have not been attested in Hinuq, Tatar, or Saaroa. 
What someone else had said can be represented in a number of ways-via quota-
tion, direct, indirect, or semi-direct speech report. It will not be appropriate to go into 
the details of how to differentiate a quote from a direct speech report; and what are the 
properties of indirect and semi-direct speech; see a summary in Aikhenvald (2011c). 
Dimmendaal (Chapter i2) discusses some features of indirect and semi-direct speech 
in Tima. 
Speech report techniques may have their own epistemic connotations. Here is an 
example. If a speaker of Arizona Tewa (Kroskrity i993: 146) chooses to specify who 
said what, a direct quotation is used. The construction includes the reported evidential 
accompanied by a complementizer: 
(25) 10-he: 
isgSTATIVE.PERF-sick 
Tm sick: he said 
gi-ba 
that-REPORTED 
na-ty 
3sgsTATIVE. PREFIX-say 
An alternative would be to use indirect speech, where the third person prefix 
replaces the first person. The complementizer remains, and the reported evidential 
is removed: 
(26) na-he: 
3sgsTATIVE.PREFIX-sick 
He said that he is sick 
gi 
that 
na-tu 
' 3sgsTATIVE.PREFIX-say 
The two alternatives are not fully synonymous. The difference between (25) and (26) 
lies in the speaker's attitude to the veracity of the information. Example (25) means "'I 
am sick': he is quoted as saying' and implies that the speaker does not vouch for the 
information reported. That is, for the native speakers of Tewa, the direct quotation 
'lacks the reliability of facticity of its indirect counterpart' (Kroskrity i993: 146). In 
contrast, the indirect speech in (26) does not contain any overtones of doubt. Similar 
16 See Aikhenvald (20uc) for a summary, and further references. 
17 See, for instance, Dimmendaal (2001), on reported speech as a 'hedging' device. 
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effects of direct speech quotations have been reported for Gahuku, Usan, and Tauya, 
all from Papua New Guinea.18 Tauya also has a reported evidential, and Usan and 
Gahuku have no evidentials. In these three languages direct quotes indicate a false 
presupposition on the part of the speaker. 
Direct quotes in Asheninka Perene serve to 'mitigate responsibility for the quoted 
statement, at the same time meeting 'the expectation of being accurate and precise' 
(§3.2 of Chapter 10). 
Direct quotes in the Ambonwari variety of Karawari have epistemic overtones. In 
Telban's words (§i.4 of Chapter 13), 'the Ambonwari are inclined to put words into 
other people's mouths in this way to (re)create their intentions'; 'it is therefore thought 
that direct quotation is more an expression of opinion or presupposition (anxious, 
desired, assumed, false, or exaggerated) of the reported than of the original speaker 
or the person involved in the event: And so, 'direct quotations can contain overtones 
of doubt and lack reliability'. Throughout my fieldwork with the Manambu, another 
group in the Sepik area of Papua New Guinea, I observed the same principle at work. 
A self-quotation in Ambonwari may have epistemic overtones: a listener is likely to 
doubt the veracity of a self-quote. A self-quotation can be a means of'lifting speaker's 
importance', or to justify why the speaker had done a particular thing. This is reminis-
cent of how speech reports in general can have overtones of causation and intention 
(Aikhenvald 2011c: 319 and references there; Overall 2008, with special relevance to 
multifunctional speech reports in Aguaruna). 
In other languages, a self-quotation is a way of stressing the veracity of what one 
is talking about (see Michael 2008, on speech practices in Nanti, a Campa Arawak 
language). In Asheninka Perene, a combination of a reportative parenthetical 'they 
say' with the assertive marker emphasizes the credibility of what is being talked about 
( §3.2 of Chapter 10 ). Or it may be employed to make sure the author of the report is 
specified. In Kalapalo, 'the emotions and motives of characters ... are realized through 
their quoted speech' (Basso i995: 295). 
Reported evidentials and reported speech (including quotations) do essentially the 
same job: they indicate that the information was acquired from someone else. It is 
no wonder, therefore, that they can acquire similar semantic extensions. A marker 
of speech report, or a generic reported parenthetical (as in Asheninka Perene, §3.2 
of Chapter 10 ), allows the speaker to leave the author of the speech report vague. 
Other techniques for expressing reported speech allow the source to be stated (see, for 
instance, §1.2 of Chapter 4, on Saaroa).19 
It thus comes as no surprise that a speech report construction is a frequent source 
for developing reported evidentials. One such grammaticalization path involves rea-
nalysis of a biclausal quotation or reportative construction whereby the matrix clause 
18 Deibler (1971: io5) on Gahuku; Reesink (1986: 259) on Usan, and MacDonald (1990) on Tauya. 
19 Further comparison is in Aikhenvald (2004: 135- 40). 
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with the verb 'say' and a complement clause of this verb become a single clause via the 
loss or reinterpretation of the subordinator (Aikhenvald 2004: 273-4; 281-3). This is 
what we see in a marker of reported speech, dizque, in Colombian Spanish. Example 
(17) illustrates this (Travis 2006): 
eso, dizque es peligroso 
and this REPORTED is dangerous no 
And this, it is said to be dangerous, isn't it? 
Similar scenarios-whereby speech report constructions have given rise to reported 
and also to quotative markers-have been described for Hinuq (Chapter 2), Tatar 
(Chapter 3), Saaroa (Chapter 4), and Ersu (Chapter 6). 
3.3 Information source: a summary 
Meanings associated with information source can be expressed as extensions of non-
evidential grammatical categories and also through members of open classes. For the 
latter, the range of meanings is wider than that of grammatical evidentials. Closed 
classes of particles and modal verbs tend to share their meanings with evidential 
strategies. 
The choice of a grammatical evidential often depends on the mood or tense of the 
clause (see §1). The choice of a parenthetical or an adverb depends on what the speaker 
wants to say. A parenthetical, an adverb, or a modal verb can have an NP or a whole 
clause in its scope. For grammatical evidentials, these options are restricted. None of 
the means listed in §§3.1-2 forms a paradigm of any sort. In contrast, grammatical 
evidentials do. 
What may justify putting the various verbs, adverbs, and parentheticals discussed 
in §§3.2.1-4 together with modal verbs and particles is the fact that they all vaguely 
relate to the ways in which one knows things. All these devices for marking infor-
mation source combine reference to inference, assumption, and often speech reports 
with increasing 'subjectification' - a 'historical pragmatic-semantic process whereby 
meanings become increasingly based in the speaker's subjective belief state, or attitude 
toward what is said' (Traugott i996: 185). This is what sets them apart from closed evi-
dential systems-whose primary meaning has nothing to do with subjectification-
and makes them similar to prototypical modalities. 
One question concerns the means a language may use to express knowledge. Anoth-
er, and a trickier one, is how and when it is appropriate to talk about knowledge and 
the ways in which it is acquired. How people discuss knowledge and express attitudes 
to its reliability and trustworthiness may depend on their status in society, on their age 
category, and even on their sex. Women and men may differ in their preferred hedg-
ing strategies (see, for instance, Bradac, Mulac, and Thompson i995). Question tags 
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seeking confirmation are widely-but perhaps incorrectly-believed to be features of 
women's speech (Dubois and Crouch 1975). All of this may depend on accepted con-
ventions within a society, on types of knowledge and on types of acceptable informa-
tion source. In a small Amazonian society one does not use a hedging strategy when 
talking about a shamanic vision-this is simply not done. 
4 Choosing, and using, an evidential 
An evidential may have an additional meaning, going beyond information source. 
This may have to do with certainty or lack thereof, probability, and unexpected infor-
mation and surprise. Choosing and using an appropriate evidential shapes communi-
cation, and may itself be shaped by established and by emerging cultural conventions. 
Different experiences may require different choices from the evidential system. 
4.1 Beyond information source 
4.1.1 Certainty, control, and first person Evidentials may have non-evidential 
overtones. One is likely to be certain about what one has seen with one's own eyes. 
The visual or a direct experience evidential tends to have overtones of commitment 
to the truth of utterance, control over the information, and certainty. It may cover 
information acquired through seeing, and also generally known and observable 
facts. Every Peruvian knows that there are monkeys in the rainforest. This generally 
known fact is expressed using a visual evidential. Example (28) comes from Cuzco 
Quechua:20 
(28) Yunka-pi-n 
rainforest-LOC-DIRECT.EVIDENTIAL 
In the rainforest, there are monkeys 
k'usillu-kuna-qa 
monkey-PL-TOPIC 
ka-n 
be-3person 
East Tucanoan languages and Tariana have two sensory evidentials-one for visual, 
and one for non-visual information. You cannot 'see' how you feel-so it is appropri-
ate to use a non-visual evidential when talking about yourself this way, in Tucano 
(Ramirez 1997: 133, 135): 
(29) yi'i-re 
1-TOP.NON.A/S 
My tooth hurts 
upi-ka 
tooth-CL:RO UND 
piiri-sa' 
hurt-PRES.NONVIS.nonthird. p 
20 Eberhard (2009: 464-5) provides similar examples for visual evidential in Mamainde, a Nambiquara 
language. 
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When you talk about how someone else feels, you judge by what you see yourself: you 
cannot get into their skin and feel what they feel. So, a visual evidential is then appro-
priate. If I see that Pedro looks very sick I will say, in Tucano: 
Peduru do'atigi' wee-mi 
Pedro sick be/ do-PRES. vis. third. person.masculine 
Pedro is sick (I see it) 
A non-visual evidential may refer to something I cannot quite see, and am not quite 
sure about. A Mamainde man has just taken a second wife, but is not quite certain if 
he has done the right thing, and so he uses the non-visual evidential in talking about 
this (Eberhard 2009: 466). 
When used with a first person subject, the non-visual, non-firsthand evidentials 
and reported evidentials in systems of various types may acquire additional meanings 
to do with lack of intention, control, awareness and volition on the part of the speaker. 
Visual evidential has an overtone of certainty-I am sure of what I see. But if I am 
talking about myself, I can use the non-visual evidential if whatever happened was out 
of my control. Suppose I broke a plate by accident-it slipped out of my hands. I will 
then say, in Tucano:2 1 
(31) bapa bope-asi 
plate break-REC.P.NONVIS.nonthird. p 
I broke a plate by accident 
This is what the literature on evidentials calls the 'first person effect': when I talk about 
myself, evidentials have somewhat different overtones. IfI was drunk or unconscious, 
and do not really remember what I did, I can even use a reported evidential to talk 
about myself: 'I spent the night drinking-reported' takes away all the responsibility 
from my being drunk all night. In Hinuq (§2.2.1 of Chapter 2), if the unwitnessed 
evidential is used with a first person subject, this implies the speaker's lack of control 
over what happened to them, or simply their lack of memory. The reported evidential 
may occur with a first person subject, with similar meanings-'lack of control or an 
unintended, unconscious participation' (§2.5 of Chapter 2). The reported evidential in 
Saaroa with the first person has a similar semantic effect (§5.2 of Chapter 4). 
Verbs covering internal states may require obligatory evidential choice depending 
on person: for instance, one may use the non-visual evidential to refer to one's own 
state, and the visual or inferred one to refer to a state experienced by someone else 
(Aikhenvald 2004: 224-5). As a result, evidentials may acquire the implicit value of 
2 1 Ramirez (1997, vol. i : 133). 
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person markers (this is similar to the distinction between 'Self' and 'Other' in eviden-
tial use in Pastaza Quichua: see Nuckolls 2008). 
Evidentials may interrelate with person in other ways. In Myky, an isolate from 
Brazil, visual and non-visual evidential distinctions are obligatory for second and 
third person, and are not made at all in the first person. 
4.1.2 Expectation of knowledge, and mirativity Suppose I see something which I 
did not expect. I can then use a non-firsthand or a non-visual evidential. A speaker 
of Jarawara saw a dead sloth-he was surprised that the sloth was dead, and used the 
non-firsthand evidential despite the fact that he actually saw it:22 
(32) jo abohi home-hino 
sloth(masc) be.dead+COMPL.CL lie-IMMEDIATE.PAST.NONFIRSTHAND.masc 
A dead sloth lay (there) (non-firsthand: as a marker of surprise) 
This meaning is known as 'mirative: Many languages employ non-visual evidentials, 
with this meaning. In Mapudungun, this is one of the uses of the non-firsthand evi-
dential -rke (see (4)-(5) above). Unwitnessed past forms in Hinuq (§2.2.1 of Chapter 2) 
have mirative overtones in the context of first-person subject, especially 'when there is 
something mysterious or unexplainable in the event: That is, an overtone of'surprise' 
is linked to the lack of previous knowledge of the speaker. Along similar lines, mira-
tive overtones of the non-firsthand past in Tatar (§4.i.2)-found just with the first-
person subject-can be linked to the lack of 'involvement' by the speaker. Overtones 
of surprise of the speaker in Saaroa (§4.2 and §5.2 of Chapter 4) may also occur if one 
is talking about oneself using the reported evidential. 
The inferred evidential expresses 'surprise' in Mamainde. When David Eberhard 
returned to the Mamainde village after a long absence, speakers were surprised that he 
could still speak the language, and commented on this, using the inferred evidential. 
They also use 'inferred' in humorous songs about nature which may take surprising 
twists: for instance, that baby toucans have (inferred) very soft beaks, unlike the young 
of many other bird species. The indirective marker in Kalmyk can have mirative mean-
ings (§13 of Chapter 7). 1be particle iki:in in Tatar usually expresses assumption (§5.2.1 
of Chapter 3). In conjunction with the indefinite future tense, it conveys overtones 
of surprise (example (25), Chapter 3). Just like the inferred evidential in Mamainde, 
this particle can be used in joking contexts. How 'mirative' extensions- or a special 
mirative marking if there is one-can be manipulated in jokes and other genres is a 
further fascinating topic. 
2 2 This example comes from Dixon (2003: 171). 'Surprise' can be expressed through other means. A highly 
unusual system of 'mirative' pronouns in Hone was described by Storch (1999). 
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Mirative meanings cover 'expectation of knowledge' rather than information source 
(also see Aikhenvald 2012c). It is thus distinct from evidentiality (see Aikhenvald 
2012c, for a cross-linguistic typology and further references). Kurt6p (Chapter 5) is 
a prime example of a language where information source, expectation of knowledge, 
and knowledge sharing are linked together (and yet distinguishable). Saaroa has an 
enclitic with a gamut of mirative meanings (§8 of Chapter 4). Asheninka Perene has 
what can be described as a 'mirative' strategy: the affect modality in content questions 
imparts overtones of the speaker's surprise at some unexpected information (§2.2 of 
Chapter 10). 'Surprise' in Karawari is marked through incorporation of the interjec-
tion kambay- 'alas!' between two verbs, one of which, or both, tend to be perception 
verbs 'hear' or 'see' (§5 of Chapter i3). Mirative meanings in Hinuq are expressed with 
a special verb (Chapter 3). Kalmyk has a mirative particle whose meanings cover sur-
prise, and also newly acquired and unexpected information (§13 of Chapter 7). 
4.2 How to choose the correct evidential 
4.2.1 Evidentials: an enviable feature? Having to always express information 
source in one's language is often viewed as an enviable feature. Speakers of languages 
without evidentials wish they had been compelled to always be so 'precise: In 
Palmer's (1996: 200) words, 'what a lot of breath and ink this might save us in 
English if we had evidential suffixes that we could use in the courtroom. Using the 
Win tun suffix, we might say, for example, "The defendant shoplift-be [be is a visual 
evidential] the compact disc': thereby eliminating the need to ask the inevitable 
question: "Did you actually see her take it?"' And, as Boas (1942: i82) put it, 'we 
could read our newspapers with much greater satisfaction if our language would 
compel them to say whether their reports are based on self-experience, inference, or 
hearsay!' 
Evidentiality is ingrained in speech habits and conventions-breach of which may 
result in losing face and reputation. And the adoption of new means of acquiring 
information, such as television or internet, results in extending the meanings of evi-
dential categories. 
If a language has obligatory evidentials, leaving them out produces a grammati-
cally awkward 'incomplete' sentence. Those who have evidentials in their languages 
complain that languages without evidentials-Portuguese and Spanish included-are 
somehow deficient and inadequate. Hence the perception of 'white people' -those 
outsiders who do not have information markers in their speech-as 'liars: Tariana and 
Tucano speakers grumble that Portuguese sounds like a 'shortcut: Hardman (1986: 133) 
reports how difficult it is for Jaqi (Aymara) speakers to imagine how one can speak a 
language which does not mark the information source. Finally she and her colleagues 
had to 'adjust their English' and always specify how they knew things, so as not to 
upset their Jaqi-speaking friends. Speakers are often conscious of how evidentials are 
to be used. 
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Among the Mamainde, a typical way to refer to a 'good, trustworthy person' is to 
call them 'one who speaks well'. Someone who is 'untrustworthy or of a questionable 
moral reputation is labelled as one who does not speak well' (Eberhard 2009: 468). 
The correct use of evidentials is the 'token' of a good speaker-and henceforth, of a 
good person. 
The same principle applies in Huallaga Quechua (Weber 1986: 142), and among 
the Tariana and the East Tucanoan peoples in the Vaupes River Basin area. 1be late 
Jose Manuel, a Tariana elder, was sneered at and said (behind his back) to be 'useless' 
because he was not using the correct remote past reported evidential. A major token 
of 'correct' Tariana is the ability to use evidentials in the right way.23 
4.2.2 Cultural conventions in evidential use: dreams, spirits, shamans, and 
authority Fixed evidential choices may always describe certain types of experience. 
We call them CULTURAL CONVENTIONS. Consider dreams. In Jarawara and Wanka 
Quechua, dreams are 'seen'; they are part of 'everyday experienced reality'.24 In 
Hinuq and in Tatar, dreams are 'seen: and are recounted as if they were personal 
experience (§5 of Chapter 2). The Asheninka Perene use the parenthetical 'appear 
clearly in a vision' and the verb 'see' to talk about dreams (§3.2 of Chapter 10). 
Dreams are 'seen' in Karawari, Aguaruna, and also Manambu and Kwoma (from 
the same area as Manambu). In Kalmyk dreams are 'seen: but recounted using the 
indirect information source marker (example (18) in §4, Chapter 7). 
But dreams experienced by ordinary humans are not part of reality in Shipibo-
Konibo-and so they are recounted using the reported evidential =ronki. However, if 
a shaman has a dream or a vision induced by the hallucinogenous ayahuasca he will 
retell this experience using direct evidential. In Tariana and Tucano, a simple mortal 
will talk about their dream using the non-visual evidential. Only a powerful shaman 
will use the visual evidential when recounting what they saw in a dream. That is, evi-
dentials can be linked to person's status, access to knowledge and power, in societies 
which we are accustomed to consider egalitarian at heart. 
In their traditional life, speakers of Kagwahiv (a Tupi-Guarani language, from the 
Upper Madeira River basin) used to rely on dreams a lot. Dreams were used to forecast 
the presence of game, to plan the day's hunt, and to foresee illness and death. In times 
of wars, dreams were relied upon to predict the victor. Relating a dream and discussing 
what it may possibly mean used to be an important part of Kagwahiv interactions. And 
every sentence in a dream contains an evidential, ra'u-a marker of non-firsthand 
information. This may appear odd: as Kracke (2010: 69) puts it, 'in our way of thinking 
about dreams, it would seem that dreams are par excellence events witnessed by the 
person telling them'. The Kagwahiv 'dream-marker' ra'u is cognate to words meaning 
23 See details in Aikhenvald (2002: 213-20; 2004: 336- 7). 
21 See Floyd (1999: 65), on Wanka Quechua, Dixon (2004: 203), on Jarawara, and Aikhenvald (2004: 
345-6). 
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'ghost: 'augury: and relating to 'falsehood' in general. Dreams can provide informa-
tion about the future; but they are regarded as essentially deceptive and unreliable: a 
dream 'is a message, a message from an unknown source. Hence it cannot be coded 
as personal experience' (2010: 73). Or, in the words of Western psychoanalyst Lacan 
(1988: i35), 'someone other than ourselves talks in our dreams'. What we have to learn 
from a psychoanalyst, speakers oflanguages with evidentials know through evidenti-
ality conventions. Along similar lines, dreams in Tsou (Yang 2000: 82) are recounted 
using the reported evidential. 
Talking about spirits in Dyirbal requires the non-visible noun marker (§7 of Chap-
ter 8). A spirit may appear in disguise-as a rainbow, or a woman. One can see the dis-
guise, or the manifestation, but not the 'true' self of the spirit. The non-visible marker is 
a way of talking about a not-quite-real reality. Along similar lines, my Tariana teachers 
often talk about their encounters with evil spirits in the jungle. This experience always 
involves the non-visual evidential. 
Knowing which evidential to use, and when, provides an important way of impos-
ing one's authority. A warrior-ancestor of the Carib-speaking Kalapalo is a strong 
character, who wishes to make a point in his speech. This attitude is reflected in the 
evidentials he uses. In Basso's (1990: 137-40) words, the most assertive and imposing 
part is marked with distant past firsthand evidential, and 'the tone is something like, 
"I bear witness": 
But if you are neither a respectable authority nor a shaman, and the community feels 
you have no reason to over-use an evidential, you may be in trouble. Weber (1986: 142) 
describes a speaker who was using the direct evidential -mi too much. To many, this 
sounded 'incautious with respect to the information' conveyed; the man was judged to 
be 'not a member of a Quechua speaking community which values his stature: 
Breaching conventions of evidential use results in possible SOCIAL EXCLUSION. 
There is an obvious connection here with knowledge and its expression, as part of 
societal norm, and knowledge as a social phenomenon: see §s. 
4.2.3 Evidentials, new technologies, and change What happens if speakers of a 
language acquire access to new ways of knowing things? As Boas put it, 'when 
changes of culture demand new ways of expression, languages are sufficiently 
pliable to follow new needs' (1942: 183). New practices-reading, television, radio, 
telephone, and internet-help us understand just how pliable the systems are. A 
Shipibo-Konibo speaker will now employ reported =ronki to talk about what they 
read in a book. And for this a speaker of Tariana or Tucano will use an assumed 
evidential, typically used for information acquired by interpretation, reasoning, or 
common sense. 
If a Shipibo-Konibo watches something on television, this implies 'experiencing the 
event oneself, since one actually "sees" what is happening' -and so they would use 
the direct evidential =ra. Tariana and Tucano speakers would use a visual evidential. 
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1be Asheninka Perene use the verb 'see' to talk about television shows (§3.2 of Chap-
ter 10). But if a Shipibo-Konibo hears something on the radio, or hears a TV report 
without seeing the picture, they will use the reported =ronki. A similar system has 
been described for Yongning Na, a Tibeto-Burman language (Lidz 2007). A Tariana 
or a Tucano would use a non-visual evidential. 
In contrast, Magar ( Grunow-Harsta 2007 ), from the Tibeto-Burman family, employs 
the inferred evidential to recount what one saw on television. This is consistent with 
how this evidential is employed in narratives: it is a way of describing a picture book. 
The reported evidential is only used to recount what one has heard. 
Before Tariana speakers acquired regular access to phones, they used a non-visual 
evidential for the occasional reports of phone conversations. Ten years on, a phone 
is part of their lives, and a conversation on the phone is being treated as the same as 
a face- to-face talk. A visual evidential is now preferred in this context. However, one 
speaker who does not have a phone at home and uses it only occasionally keeps using 
a non-visual evidential. And for the few speakers who now are in the habit of regularly 
chatting over the internet, this is also like face-to-face: a visual evidential is preferred. 
When a speaker of Hinuq or of Tatar retells something they have seen on TV or 
heard on the radio, they use unwitnessed forms-since they were not there to see the 
event for themselves, and are relying on someone else's account (§2.3 of Chapter 2 and 
§6.1 of Chapter 3). An evidentiality-neutral form can also be used. For talking about 
live broadcasts, only neutral past forms are appropriate. In fictional stories, unwit-
nessed and evidentiality-neutral forms can be employed, with different stylistic effects: 
using the unwitnessed form makes the story sounds like a traditional tale, while using 
an evidentiality-neutral form sounds as if they actually witnessed the event. A phone 
conversation in Hinuq is treated just like a face-to-face talk (§5 of Chapter 2). 
The attitude to knowledge, and the means of acquiring it, may change over time. 
Telban (Chapter 13) has been working with the Karawari people for more than twenty-
five years. Back in the old days, what people knew was reliable and steady-based on 
'the internal knowledge of the past'. Nowadays, with new technologies coming in, the 
pace of life quickening and communications improving, speculations are pervasive. 
And people constantly complain about 'unreliability of information' and untrustwor-
thiness of the sources. The frequency of assumptions and 'wishful thinking' in actual 
discourse has dramatically increased ( §1 of Chapter 13). As a consequence, the value 
of different kinds of'knowledge' has shifted. 
4.2.4 Evidentials and genres Types of stories may always go together with just 
one evidential. We call these TOKENS of a genre. In the overwhelming majority of 
languages, ancestral stories and legends are told using reported evidential. Traditional 
tales in Jarawara are told using non-firsthand evidential, which in 90 per cent of the 
cases is followed by the reported suffix. A story about what happened to the speaker 
can be firsthand, as in Jarawara, experiential, as in Matses, or visual, as in Tariana, 
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Tucano, and other languages with many evidential options. Fairy tales and legends in 
Hinuq are cast in the unwitnessed evidential (§2.2.1 of Chapter 2). The non-firsthand 
evidential is used in legends, folk-tales, and historical accounts in Ta.tar (§6.2 and 
Table 1 in Chapter 3 offer an overview of evidentials as tokens of genre in this 
language). In Ersu, traditional legends are told using the reported evidential (§5.1 of 
Chapter 6). In Kalmyk, a story to which the speaker was a witness is told using the 
direct evidential. 111e indirective marker is preferred in traditional narratives and folk-
tales. Reported evidential is used in the modern newspaper style. New genres and new 
means of communication require new speech practices. In Kalmyk the prospective 
evidential -x bolv is used in newspaper language. It marks reported information about 
planned future events obtained in personal interviews with their planners (point (c) in 
§8 of Chapter 7). 
Evidentials, and evidentiality strategies, can serve as grammatical means for dif-
ferentiating genres of stories. A historical account in Aguaruna is typically told using 
nominalizations as an evidentiality strategy with a non-firsthand meaning. A tradi-
tional myth employs this same strategy in addition to the narrative modality marker 
(§5.2 of Chapter 11). In Tariana, an autobiographical story will be told using the visual 
evidential. A traditional tale would be cast in reported, and a historical account about 
one's ancestors-which is based on visible traces of their movements-will involve 
inferred evidentials. A story about shamans' activities is often cast in non-visual (the 
explanation given to me was 'because it all happens in the shaman's mind'). 
Evidentials may be used several times in a clause to make the narrative more vivid: 
that is, for stylistic effect. This is the case in Hinuq and in Tatar (Chapters 2 and 3). In 
Saaroa, the reported evidential can be repeated if a constituent on which it occurs is 
contrastive (§3.3 of Chapter 4). 
4.2.5 Truth, lies, and evidentials The 'truth value' of an evidential may be different 
from that of the verb in its clause. It is simply not the case that those who speak a 
language with evidentials never lie. Evidentials can be manipulated to tell a lie. As 
Eberhard (2009: 468) puts it in his grammar of Mamainde (based on living with the 
people for eighteen years): 
I do not see any basis for the supposition that they have a stronger than a normal concern for 
truth. The evidential system, in fact, can be taken advantage of and exploited quite ingeniously 
for the express purpose oflying, not only about the content, but also one's degree of involvement 
in a given situation. 
One can give correct information source and wrong information, as in saying 'He is dead-
reported: when you were told that he is alive, or correct information and wrong informa-
tion source, as in saying 'He is alive-visual: when in fact you were told that he is alive, and 
did not see this. Having evidentials is not about needing to be 'truthful: In a similar vein, 
one does not need to speak a language with grammatical tense to be punctual. 
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Evidentials are a powerful device for manipulating knowledge. Using them in an 
appropriate and accepted fashion is a means of safeguarding your reputation. Speak-
ing properly, and using the right evidentials, are a means of saving face. They are often 
the basis for a value judgement: a good and proper person is the one 'who speaks well' 
(Eberhard 2009: 468). This takes us to our next section. 
5 How to talk about knowledge 
Epistemological devices-that is, evidentials and other means of expressing informa-
tion source-reflect the means of acquiring knowledge, and attitudes to it. 'Knowl-
edge' is a 'social phenomenon, an aspect of social relations between people' (Hill and 
Irvine 1992: 17). Proper linguistic expression of knowledge promotes mutual under-
standing as a basis for empathy. But expressing your knowledge in an inappropriate 
way may result in social exclusion and rejection. 
5.1 On being precise 
Being precise in one's information source goes together with cultural conventions 
which appear to be particularly strong in languages with evidentials. Such conventions 
may include: 
(i) whether one should be as specific as possible when speaking, or whether a high 
degree of vagueness is a normal social expectation, and 
(ii) how much information is to be shared-whether one should tell people what 
they want to know, or whether 'new information' is regarded as prized goods, 
only to be disseminated for some appropriate return. 
'Information sharing' is an obligatory verbal category in Kurtop (Chapter 5). A similar 
principle is reflected in the marker of 'joint perception' in Maaka (Chapter 9). 
In many linguistic communities with evidentiality, being as specific as possible 
about what one has to say is obligatory. Those who do not obey the cultural conven-
tions of evidential usage are not to be trusted. Quechua cultural postulates summa-
rized by Weber (1986: 138) point in the same direction. These are: 
1. (Only) one's own experience is reliable. 
2. Avoid unnecessary risk, as by assuming responsibility for information of 
which one is not absolutely certain. 
3. Don't be gullible. (Witness the many Quechua folk-tales in which the villain is 
foiled because of his gullibility.) 
4. Assume responsibility only if it is safe to do so. (The successful assumption of 
responsibility builds stature in the community.) 
'!bat is, one should provide the information required, and be specific about it. In a 
similar vein, McLendon (2003: 113) reports: 
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Eastern Pomo speakers from whom I have learned Eastern Pomo since 1959 remembered that 
when they were children their grandparents constantly reminded them to be careful how they 
spoke. 111ey were told to be especially careful to speak well to, and about, other people, because 
if they didn't the person spoken about, or to, might be offended and try to 'poison' them, that 
is, use ritual or other means to bring them misfortune, illness, or even death. Evidentials which 
distinguish non-visual sensory experience, inference, memory, and knowledge seem a useful 
means of speaking with care, asserting only what one has evidence for, and making one's evi-
dence clear. 
In the context of Amazonian societies, the requirement to be precise in one's informa-
tion sources may be related to the common belief that there is an explicit cause-most 
often, sorcery-for everything that happens. So as not to be blamed for something 
that in fact they had no responsibility for, a speaker is careful always to be as explicit 
as possible about what they have done (see Aikhenvald 2004).1bis relates to the desir-
ability of stating the evidence for everything that is said, visually obtained information 
being the most valuable. The speaker is also careful not to impute their assumption and 
their information source onto another person. Such imputation could be potentially 
dangerous: if the speaker is perceived as having access to how other people know 
things, they may well be regarded as a sorcerer. In a society where sorcery is the most 
dangerous crime of all, to be accused of it is hardly desirable. Different conventions in 
stating information source may create conflicts, miscommunication and social exclu-
sion. Evidentials provide grammatical backing for Grice's (1989) Maxim of Manner, 
helping avoid 'obscurity of expression' and 'ambiguity'. 
Being informative has different implications in different cultures. For the everyday 
exchange of information in Malagasy in remote rural communities 'the basic norm 
concerning free exchange of information simply does not apply: New information 
is a 'premium' to be imparted piece by piece. As Keenan and Ochs (1979: 149) put it, 
'possession of new information is possession of a scarce good allowing the posses-
sor to command the attention of others: But to a Westerner, the Malagasy ways of 
information exchange sound vague and uninformative. Does this feature of Malagasy 
discourse correlate with the absence of evidentials in the language? Does it correlate 
with any specific strategies of talking about what one knows, and the structure of the 
semantic field of cognition? One wonders. 
It is however not the case that once you have evidentials in your language you 
have to be precise. In some languages with a small evidential system there may be a 
non-firsthand term which lacks the 'precision' of information source (examples from 
Mapudungun are in (4) and (5)). There is no indication that many languages with 
just a reported evidential- such as Basque or Estonian-have a requirement to be 
( . ) precise. 
The correlations between the requirement to be precise in one's information source 
imposed by the grammar, and cultural conventions, are very tempting, but highly ten-
tative. Moreover, the same requirements and conventions appear to hold in languages 
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with no grammatical evidentiality. Neither Tuvaluan (Besnier 1992) nor Weyewa 
(Kuipers 1992) have grammatical evidentials. And yet what was said above applies to 
speakers of these languages, too. Being precise and explicit is important for speakers of 
Aguaruna (Chapter 11) and Asheninka Perene (Chapter 10 ). However, these languages 
do not have grammatical evidentials. 
Australian Aboriginal communities value explicitness. One should be as specific 
as possible in identification and in description. Only a few Australian languages have 
grammatical marking for information source. In others, this is achieved by lexical 
means. In Dyirbal, for instance, there is no verb 'to know'; it would simply be too 
vague. When R. M. W. Dixon enquired how to say 'I know where the money is hidden: 
he was told that details had to be provided. One could say 'I saw where the money is 
hidden' or 'My father told me where the money is hidden'. Evidentials in Dyirbal are 
limited to a noun phrase (see §2.3 and Chapter 8). 
Being specific as to one's information source appears to correlate with the size 
of a community. In a small community everyone keeps an eye on everyone else, 
and the more precise one is in indicating how information was acquired, the less 
the danger of gossip, accusation, and so on. No wonder that most languages with 
highly complex evidential systems are spoken by small communities. On the other 
hand, why is it that some languages spoken in small closed communities have only 
a reported evidential? Fortescue (2003: 301) is also convincing when he speculates 
that 
presumably life in very small, scattered Arctic communities, where everyone is likely to know 
of everyone else's doings and where rumours spread easily, is such as to make being VAGUE 
[emphasis mine] about one's source of information ... a generally sensible strategy. 
Speech styles and genres may also correlate with degree of precision, and how attitudes 
to knowledge and 'truth' can be cast. An open debate-or a longhouse address-in a 
traditional society may reveal power relationships reflected in talking about 'truth' 
and how it is known (see, for example, Lindstrom 1992, on Tanna, an Austronesian-
speaking group in Vanuatu). The expression of how one knows things may be different 
in everyday language, and in a secret language, including 'avoidance' styles. The lan-
guage used in spirit possession and by mediums may also differ from the 'normal' style 
in how knowledge is talked about (see, for instance, Storch 2011, on secret languages 
and special 'spirit' languages in Africa). 
The requirement for precision is a feature of the ordinary Dyirbal. In traditional 
times, there used to be another register employed when speaking in the presence of 
in-laws (this is known as 'avoidance style'). In Dixon's words (§8 of Chapter 8), 'while 
a high value is placed on precision in normal speech, it is considered appropriate to 
be deliberately vague in an avoidance situation. There you have it- different levels of 
specificity and generality, each in its proper place: 
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5.2 The value of knowledge 
A requirement to be precise may correlate with the value placed by the community 
on a particular type of knowledge (which may be restricted). If something was seen, 
heard, inferred, and also assumed, the 'visual' source is likely to be the first option in a 
'hierarchy' of evidential choices. Visual perception is the most 'valuable' source. 
In many languages with evidentials, it is a feature which speakers are prepared to 
discuss. An evidential can be 'rephrased' with a verb of perception which roughly 
corresponds to its meaning. The late America Brito was the only person among the 
Tariana to have witnessed the Offering Ritual. He told a story about it using visual 
evidentials. Some of the audience looked at him incredulously. Reacting to this, he 
added 'I saw this-visual-remote-past: Metalinguistic perception of evidentials opens 
a gateway to our understanding of representation of knowledge, and non-evidential 
ways of expressing epistemological nuances (see also Aikhenvald 2008). 
Being a 'good' speaker-proficient and 'correct' in one's evidential choice-is equat-
ed to a being a reliable citizen in numerous Amazonian societies (see Eberhard 2009: 
468, on Mamainde, and Aikhenvald 2013, on the Vaupes area and beyond). 
Speakers of mainstream European languages tend to think of 'hearsay' as unreli-
able. But for predominantly oral cultures, valuable knowledge used to be embodied 
in, and transmitted through, traditional stories and speech reports. As Overall (§5.2 
of Chapter 11) puts it, 'the canon of oral literature . .. is a means by which the com-
munity can maintain a body of knowledge that is more than one person can handle 
alone: Within an essentially oral tradition of transmitting knowledge, 'marking a 
narrative as hearsay' has the opposite effect of what you expect in English: 'it imparts 
the legitimacy of precedent to the narrative being related: This provides a reason why 
in many essentially oral cultures reported information has no epistemic overtones 
of doubt. 
The value of types of knowledge changes over time. With the spread of new technol-
ogies and new and faster means of communication, the Karawari started relying more 
on assumptions and speculations than on the traditional knowledge of the past (§i.4 of 
Chapter 13). And as oral cultures throughout Amazonia acquire literacy systems (see 
Aikhenvald 2012a: 60, 381), the value of the 'written word' increases dramatically. The 
impact on evidentiality systems is yet to come. 
Epistemological expressions (which subsume evidentials) tell us something about 
the speech community. They may be used to show power, authority, and agency. An 
omniscient shaman 'sees' everything. That his special knowledge can be cast in visual 
evidential highlights his power and authority. As Duranti (1990) puts it, 'language does 
not simply reflect the world, it also shapes it, fashions it'. 
Tbis is directly related to language ideologies and theories of knowledge, including 
the nature of theories of mind, the role of intention in linguistic communication and 
social interaction, and the importance of empathy. rlbe requirement to mark informa-
tion source in Western Apache (a language with evidentiality: de Reuse 2003: 96) may 
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go together with 'Athabaskan attitudes about the autonomy of the person ... , resulting 
in a reluctance to speak for another person, or to impute feelings to another person'. 
1he use of evidentials in Pastaza Quichua (Nuckolls 2008) reflects the distinction 
between 'Self' and 'Other'. It appears that the linguistic expression might help us solve 
the puzzle of the 'opacity' of other's minds, in an endeavour to understand 'other's' 
motivation and to cooperate with each other (in the spirit of Robbins and Rumsey 
2008, Rumsey 2008 and Duranti 2008). 
It is undoubtedly the case that some categories are particularly open to diffusion 
and contact-induced change. Evidentials are a case in point. It appears that the atti-
tudes to precision in communicating one's information and information source are 
as well. 
5.3 Why evidentials? 
When we look for extralinguistic explanations for linguistic categories, we should 
avoid the danger of being circular. Do Tucano or Quechua have an elaborate system 
of evidentials because of a cultural requirement to be precise about one's information 
source lest one is accused of sorcery? Or is the explanation the other way round? 
At present, all that can be suggested is that some communities in some areas-for 
instance, in the Amazonian area, and those in the adjoining Andean region-in some 
way share a common set of beliefs, mental attitudes, and behavioural conventions, as 
well as discourse genres; and that these are compatible with the independent devel-
opment of evidential systems with their requirement to be as precise and as specific 
as possible about information source. This could help explain why evidentiality has 
independently evolved in at least six (possibly, more) places in Amazonia, and also 
why it is so susceptible to being diffused in their language contact. 
Knowledge correlates with power and control. Storch and Coly (§5 of Chapter 9) 
hypothesize that a tendency towards exclusive control of knowledge among the Maaka 
may be responsible for the development of its complex system of evidentials and epis-
temics. 1he requirement to be precise, and the importance of expressing oneself well, 
appear to be a major motivation for having evidentials in one's language. As Eberhard 
(2009: 469) puts it, 
'llie avoidance of being wrong is intrinsically related to the avoidance of losing face. The entire 
Mamainde evidentiality system, then, may have the larger social function of providing the 
speaker with a way to avoid losing face within a society where one's words are connected to 
one's character. 
6 About this volume 
We aim at a cross-linguistic overview of the gamut of epistemological devices across a 
selection of languages in terms of parameters and issues outlined in this chapter. The 
volume contains in-depth discussion of twelve languages, from a variety of families 
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and areas. None of them have been previously described with regard to grammatical 
and other expressions of knowledge, and its sociolinguistic status. Some languages 
included here have evidentiality systems, others do not. Each chapter systematically 
addresses grammatical and other deviecs involved in the expression of knowledge 
and information source, and their cultural and sociolinguistic features, and practices. 
Eight of the twelve languages described here have grammatical evidentiality. Lan-
guages with small systems of grammatical evidentials are discussed first. Chapter 2, by 
Diana Forker, addresses 'The grammar of knowledge in Hinuq', a Nakh-Daghestanian 
(north-east Caucasian) language with a non-firsthand (or non-witnessed) evidential 
contrasted to evidentiality-neutral terms. Chapter 3, by Teija Greed, focuses on evi-
dentials and epistemic expressions in Tatar ('The expression of knowledge in Tatar'). 
Evidentiality in Tatar, a Turkic language, is of the same type as that ofHinuq. Both lan-
guages have a plethora of other grammatical and non-grammatical means of express-
ing knowledge, including speech reports and quotes. Saaroa, an obsolescent Formosan 
language, is discussed by Chia-jung Pan in Chapter 4 ('The grammar of knowledge in 
Saaroa'). This language has just one reported evidential. Pan addresses the intricacies 
of its use, and other means of referring to how one knows things. 
We then turn to languages with more elaborate systems of grammatical evidential-
ity. Chapter 5, by Gwendolyn Hyslop, 'The grammar of knowledge in Kurtop: eviden-
tiality, mirativity, and expectation of knowledge', focuses on a highly complex system 
of intertwined information source, attitude to knowledge, and whether or not it is 
unexpected to the speaker or the audience. 1bis is followed by Sihong Zhang's discus-
sion of'The expression of knowledge in Ersu', another Tibeto-Burman language, with 
a more straightforward three-term system of evidentials, and a plethora of evidential-
ity strategies and other means of expressing source of information and its reliability. 
Kalmyk, a Mongolic language from Central Russia, is discussed, by Elena Skribnik 
and Olga Seesing, in Chapter 7 ('Evidentiality in Kalmyk'). This discussion reveals a 
highly complex system of grammatical marking of information source with a basic 
distinction between direct and indirect evidentials, with an additional option to spec-
ify inference, assumption, and reported information in various tenses and aspects 
(including the future). The time of inference does not have to be the same as the time 
of the actual event; this is also reflected in the evidential system of Kalmyk. 
Information source may be encoded just within a noun phrase. Dyirbal, an Aus-
tralian language, analysed by R. M. W. Dixon in Chapter 8 ('The non-visible marker 
in Dyirbal') is a prime example of this. In Chapter 9, 'The grammar of knowledge 
in Maaka (Western Chadic, Nigeria)', Anne Storch and Jules Jacques Coly address a 
complicated system of expressing information source within a noun phrase, and also 
within a clause. This is in addition to further evidentiality strategies with their own 
epistemic overtones. 
How do languages without grammatical evidentiality express knowledge? In Chap-
ter 10, 'Expression of information source meanings in Asheninka Perene (Arawak)', 
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Elena Mihas offers a detailed discussion of evidentiality strategies, parentheticals, and 
other knowledge-related expressions in the language. In his 'Nominalization, knowl-
edge, and information source in Aguaruna' (Chapter 11), Simon E. Overall discusses 
various ways of expressing knowledge in this language from the small Jivaroan family 
in the Andean foothills. These include a narrative modality, and nominalizations. In 
Aguaruna- and in Asheninka Perene-speaking communities, being precise in stating 
one's information source is a cultural requirement. These languages make do with 
numerous devices, none of which are fully grammaticalized. Tima, from the small 
Katia-Rashad group in the Nuba mountains of the Sudan, does not have grammatical-
ized evidentials. In Chapter 12, 'The grammar of knowledge in Tima: Gerrit J. Dim-
mendaal looks at the ways in which knowledge, its sources and speakers' attitudes 
to it can be expressed through various constructions, including ventive, logophoric 
markers, speech reports, and ideophones. 
Chapter 13, 'Saying, seeing, and knowing among the Karawari of Papua New Guin-
ea, is somewhat different from the rest. Correlations between linguistic expression of 
knowledge and the conceptualization of its value in a changing society are an impor-
tant issue to address. The Sepik region of Papua New Guinea is renowned for its focus 
on the value of knowledge in its varied guises. 'Ibis value easily translates into mon-
etary terms: as shown by Harrison (1990 ), words, spells, and other pieces of knowledge 
can be bought and sold. Karawari is a highly synthetic language from Lower Sepik 
family. Similarly to other languages of the region, there are no grammatical eviden-
tials. And yet, the ways of talking about knowledge, its sources and reliability, are 
highly elaborate. Based on more than twenty-five years of work among the Karawari, 
Borut Telban, an eminent anthropologist, explores the nature and the expression of 
knowledge, and concomitant changes in recent years. 
Evidentials as closed grammatical systems are different from information source 
marked in other ways (just like time, a real-life concept, is different from tense, real-
ized in grammar). Meanings related to information source may be expressed through 
open classes of verbs (of perception, opinion, speech, and others), adverbs, and 
parentheticals. 
These tend to be richer in their semantic range than closed systems of grammatical 
evidentials. Information source may be expressed via a closed subclass of modal verbs, 
or via particles (often grammaticalized from verbs). They are much closer to gram-
matical evidentials in their nature, and their meanings. 
As Heine (1997: 14-15) put it: 
the way people in Siberia or the Kalahari Desert experience the world around them can imme-
diately be held responsible for the way they shape their grammars. Although conceptualisation 
strategies are perhaps the main driving force for linguistic categorisation, conceptualisation is 
not the only force that can be held responsible for why grammar is structured the way it is .... 
Another, equally important, force is communication. 
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111is volume spans languages with and without evidentiality systems, focusing on 
knowledge across the borders of grammar and lexicon. How do communicative prac-
tices shape the expression of knowledge through grammatical and other means? This 
is what the volume is about. 
Appendix. On terminological clarity 
The term 'evidential' primarily relates to information source as a closed grammatical 
system. The term 'information source' relates to the corresponding conceptual cat-
egory. This is akin to the distinction between the category of'tense', as grammaticalized 
location in time, and the concept of'time'. This was addressed in §1 of the main chapter. 
The view of evidentiality which goes back to Boas' work, and is followed here, is that 
it is a grammatical category in its own right with information source as its primary 
meaning. Talking about 'lexical evidentiality' is unhelpful. It would be similar to refer-
ring to words like today and tomorrow in English as 'lexical tense'. 
Evidentiality is a verbal grammatical category in its own right. It does not bear 
any straightforward relationship to truth, the validity of a statement, or the speak-
er's responsibility. Evidentials may have extensions to do with certainty, uncertainty, 
probability, doubt, and commitment or lack thereof. But the presence of such exten-
sions does not make evidentials into 'modals', a subcategory of epistemic or any other 
modality, nor of irrealis. This can be compared to gender systems: in many languages 
feminine gender is associated with diminution, or endearment (see numerous exam-
ples in Aikhenvald 2000 ), and masculine gender with augmentative. This however 
does not mean that gender is a type of diminutive or augmentative category. 
Evidentiality does not offer 'justification' for a statement, nor 'evidence' (as one expects 
in a court). Neither does a tense on a verb offer 'justification: or evidence for some-
thing being done in a particular time frame. Gender marking and agreement in Indo-
European languages is not a means of'justification' for the existence of men and women. 
We can now summarize a number of misconceptions concerning evidentials. 
Some misconceptions concerning evidentials 
L Evidential marking provides justification for a statement: WRONG. 
2. An evidential reflects attitude to evidence: WRONG. 
3. Evidentiality is a type of modality, mood, or aspect: WRONG. 
4. Evidentiality is universal, because every language has a way of expressing how 
one knows things: WRONG. 
5. If a language has verbs meaning 'see', 'hear', and 'smell: it has evidentiality: 
WRONG. 
6. If a language has a way of saying 'probably', it has evidentiality: WRONG. 
7. Evidentiality is a gradient category: WRONG. 
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8. Evidentiality is the same as evidence: WRONG, just as grammatical gender is 
not the same as biological sex. 
9. Speakers oflanguages with evidentials have to always tell the truth: WRONG. 
io. Languages with evidentials divide into those where evidentials have epistemic 
extensions and those where they do not: WRONG. 
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